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INTRODUCTION 
Border regions are by their very nature contested sites.1 Both 
contraband—illegal narcotics, humans, arms, and other uninspected 
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goods—and legitimate goods move through these areas.2 It does so 
evading state control, avoiding taxation, ignoring licensing, 
regularization, or some other official sanction or levy or inspection. The 
smuggling routes for contraband—drugs, products, people, and 
weapons—are lucrative; it is no wonder that border regions are zones of 
insecurity, for there is a scarcity of law enforcement or officials are on 
the payroll of smugglers.3 
The US-Mexico border may well be such a contested site, yet it 
has played a large part of the hugely successful liberalized trade between 
Mexico, the United States, and Canada, under the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).4 The trade pact, which went into effect on 
January 1, 1994, integrated the economy of Mexico, a developing 
country, with those of its two hemispheric partner countries, both of 
which were developed.5 The amount of trade between the three countries 
since 1994 has almost quadrupled.6 The supply chain for North 
America’s economies has been streamlined.7 Economies of scale have 
resulted in more efficiency, greater productivity, and higher profits for 
corporations in all three countries.8 There have been hundreds of 
thousands of jobs created but also lost.9 
                                                     
 1 The term “contested site,” “contested space,” “contested terrain,” or “ungoverned 
territory/space” refers to “failed or failing states; poorly controlled land or maritime borders or 
airspace; or areas within otherwise viable states where the central government’s authority does 
not extend.” ANGEL RABASA & JOHN E. PETERS, UNGOVERNED TERRITORIES 1 (Miriam Polon 
ed., 2007). Both physical space and the level of state control are vital to an area’s 
characterization as an ungoverned territory. Id. 
 2 James M. Cooper, The Complicated Relationship: A Snapshot of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 
2010.10 INT’L REPORTS OF THE KONRAD ADENAUER FOUND. 35, 56, (Sept. 30, 2010), available 
at http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_20667-544-2-30.pdf?100930130221. 
 3 The level of governance in a territory can be indicated by control over borders. The function of 
borders can be the “interface between nation-states. . .[or] barriers where states control the 
transnational movement of people and goods.” RABASA & PETERS, supra note 1, at 12. 
 4 See North American Free Trade Agreement Preamble, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). [hereinafter 
NAFTA, Can.-Mex.-U.S.] 
 5 See James M. Cooper, The North American Free Trade Agreement and Its Legacy on the 
Resolution of Intellectual Property Disputes, 43 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 157 (2012). 
 6 See generally Mohammed Aly Sergie, NAFTA’s Economic Impact, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/trade/naftas-economic-impact/p15790; see also 
M. ANGELES VILLARREAL & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42965, THE NORTH 
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) 10–14 (2015), available at 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42965.pdf. 
 7 Cooper, supra note 5. 
 8 See generally Josh Bivens, Globalization, American Wages, And Inequality: Past, Present And 
Future, ECON. POLICY INST. (Sept. 6, 2007), http://s1.epi.org/files/page/-
/old/workingpapers/wp279.pdf; see also Jaana Remes, A Tale of Two Mexicos: Growth and 
Propensity in a Two-Speed Economy, in NAFTA 20 YEARS LATER 14–3 30, 34 (2014), available 
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The United States’ porous borders and the rise of illegal 
immigration dominate public discourse and media coverage on a daily 
basis.10 The ongoing strength of narco-trafficking organizations11 and the 
other crimes that occur along the US-Mexico border help sensationalize 
the violence.12 There has been for decades a long-running call for better 
security at the border with Mexico.13 This has grown only louder in 
recent years and resulted in US border vigilantes taking up arms and 
positions along the border. Also frequently, there is movement for even 
greater integration of the economies of the United States, Mexico, and 
Canada through the Trans-Pacific Partnership, more investment in 
Mexico’s newly privatized energy sector, and other opportunities to 
enjoy the comparative advantage that comes with free trade.14 In both 
                                                     
at http://www.piie.com/publications/briefings/piieb14-3.pdf; see also Carlos Salas, Mexico’s 
Haves and Have-Nots: NAFTA Sharpens the Divide, 35 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 32, 
34 (2002); see also Ralph Reiland, NAFTA: Winners & Losers, PITTS. TRIB. REV. 30, 34–35 
(Jan. 29, 2007). 
 9 VILLARREAL & FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 24–25; see also U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
OPENING MARKETS, CREATING JOBS: ESTIMATED U.S. EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF TRADE WITH 
FTA PARTNERS 1 (2010), available at 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/100514_ftajobs_full_0.pdf. 
 10 PAUL GANSTER & DAVID E. LOREY, THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER INTRO THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY xvii (2d ed. 2008): “At the U.S.-Mexican border. . .only a tiny percentage of the 
people crossing the border on a regular basis do so illegally, yet this percentage frequently 
constitute the only border story deemed worth reporting in the mass media of both Mexico and 
United States.” Id. 
 11 “Drug-related homicides have dramatically increased in recent years in Mexico along the nearly 
2,000-mile border it shares with the United States.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-13-175, SOUTHWEST BORDER SECURITY: DATA ARE LIMITED AND CONCERNS VARY 
ABOUT SPILLOVER CRIME ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER (2013), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652320.pdf. 
 12 MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, H. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY, A LINE IN THE SAND: 
CONFRONTING THE THREAT AT THE SOUTHWEST BORDER 4 (Comm. Print 2006). 
 13 “In the contemporary era, since the mid-1970s, ‘border control’ has emerged as a salient topic in 
U.S. politics, with concern for it often spurred on by sensationalist portrayals of undocumented 
immigration, drug trafficking, and occasionally even the threat of terrorism at critical issues for 
the U.S.-Mexico border region.” TIMOTHY DUNN, THE MILITARIZATION OF THE U.S.-MEXICO 
BORDER, 1978–1992 1 (Victor J. Guerra ed., 1996). 
 14 Addressing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to his Organization for Action audience, U.S. 
President Obama expressed that the TPP is “the highest-standard trade agreement in our history” 
and the “most progressive trade agreement in our history.” William A. Galston, A Trade Deal 
With Help For U.S. Workers Baked In, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2015, 7:15 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-trade-deal-with-help-for-u-s-workers-baked-in-1430262925. One 
day before Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto took office, on discussing Mexico’s 
challenges, Peña Nieto expressed that he would like to focus on “prosperity issues,” and “the 
TPP is a great opportunity in that regard.” Tim Padgett, Mexico’s Peña Nieto Talks to TIME: 
‘We Can Move Beyond the Drug War’, TIME (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://world.time.com/2012/11/30/mexicos-pena-nieto-talks-to-time-we-can-move-beyond-the-
drug-war/. 
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stronger border security and deeper economic integration, private actors 
are playing increasing roles. 
This Article is about the proliferation of private actors playing a 
role at the “broken border.” The Introduction of this Article sets out the 
conceptual framework for the Article and provides the roadmap for each 
part. Part I examines which private actors and corporations have 
increased their role at the US-Mexico border. These actors include 
multinational corporations including Mexican-sited factories 
(maquiladoras) and US government contractors engaging in national 
security work, as well as criminal organizations like human smugglers 
(polleros and coyotes) and drug cartels (narcotraficantes) from the 
Mexico side, and the border vigilantes, such as the Minutemen and 
American Border Patrol, on the US side. 
Part II then examines the reasons why the role of private actors is 
expanding. These include various regional attempts by the US, Mexican, 
and Canadian governments to regulate border trade including NAFTA 
and the Security and Prosperity Partnership. There have also been 
bilateral (US-Mexico) attempts to fix the so-called “broken border” like 
the Merida Initiative. Many of these initiatives have provided a windfall 
for multinational corporations. Corporations have enjoyed the 
comparative advantages that come with a regional economy: reduction 
and elimination of trade barriers, a North American supply chain, and the 
ability for investors to sue sovereign states for lost profits incurred 
through nationalization, like takings or expropriation. There have also 
been many opportunities to contract for the US, Canadian, and Mexican 
governments.15 
Part III argues that the expanded activities of private actors 
should be better regulated, and in the case of criminal organizations, 
stopped. The broadening of the canvas of individual networks that work 
along the border provides an opportunity to broaden the canvas of private 
actors.16 There are many layers of motive, but economic interest is the 
                                                     
 15 See Kate Linthicum, Private companies profit from U.S. immigration detention boom, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-immigrant-
detention-20150424-story.html. 
 16 GUNNAR BECK, FICHTE AND KANT ON FREEDOM, RIGHTS, AND LAW 21 n.22 (2008) (“The 
doctrine of Methodological Individualism as a methodological precept for the social sciences can 
be traced back to Max Weber, in particular to the first chapter of Economy and Society. It 
amounts to the claim that social phenomena must be explained by showing how they result from 
individual actions, which in turn must be explained through reference to the intentional states 
that motivate the individual actors.”). 
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overwhelming reason.17 Finally, Part IV provides some concluding ideas 
concerning new forms of sovereignty and provides a call for more action 
among states to secure their respective borders in the context of the wars 
on drugs and on terror while also facilitating trade through managed 
borders to provide for economic growth and increased opportunity in 
legitimate activities. 
I. THE PROLIFERATION OF PRIVATE ACTORS AT THE UNITED 
STATES-MEXICO BORDER 
This Part examines the proliferation of non-state actors and their 
increasing role at the US-Mexico border. This Part details the various 
actors including drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), which control 
and fight over routes through Mexico (plazas), and human smugglers and 
then looks at the role that multinational corporations play in the 
dynamics of the border.18 Lastly, this Part examines the border vigilante 
groups on the US side of the border. 
A. DRUG CARTELS 
According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 
there are several major DTOs in Mexico today including the Sinaloa 
Cartel, Los Zetas, Tijuana Cartel, Juarez Cartel, Gulf Cartel, and La 
Familia Mochoacana (from which the Knights Templar originate.)19 
Together they account for an estimated $30 to $50 billion in revenue.20 It 
                                                     
 17 “Of course, by increasing the freedom of individuals the law makes it easier for them to exploit 
whatever material resources or economic power they possess. A legal order that seeks to promote 
individual freedom by guaranteeing a maximum degree of calculability will therefore inevitably 
work to the advantage of those who possess economic power and to the disadvantage of those 
who do not - will, in other words, sharpen and stabilize existing disparities in the material well-
being of different individuals and classes in society. However, if one places a very high value on 
individual freedom and legal calculability, these distributional consequences may be morally 
acceptable - especially to those who stand to gain as a result.” ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, MAX 
WEBER 94 (William Twining ed., 1983). 
 18 Craig A. Bloom, Square Pegs And Round Holes: Mexico, Drugs, And International Law, 34.2 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 345, 358 (2012). 
 19 JUNE BEITTEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41576, MEXICO’S DRUG TRAFFICKING 
ORGANIZATION: SOURCE AND SCOPE OF THE VIOLENCE 1, 9 (2013), available at 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42965.pdf. 
 20 The drug industry is the second-largest source of foreign currency in Mexico, just behind oil. It 
earns somewhere between $30 billion and $50 billion a year—no one really knows, including the 
people in the industry.” Charles Bowden, The War Next Door, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Mar. 1, 
2010), http://www.hcn.org/issues/42.4/the-war-next-door. Colombian and Mexican cartels earn 
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is no wonder that competition is deadly, with some 120,000 dead since 
the drugs war in Mexico ramped up in late 2006.21 Events change rapidly 
as cartels fold, merge, or fall prey to violence or arrest. For example, in 
just a few months, the Jalisco Cartel Nueva Generation increased its 
territory and stepped up its attacks, even bringing down a Mexican 
military helicopter in a firefight.22 
The largest and most powerful DTO in the Western Hemisphere, 
the Sinaloa Cartel, was once headed by Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman.23 
By 2011, the Sinaloa Cartel controlled 45 percent of drug trade in 
Mexico.24 Today, “[t]he Sinaloa Cartel is the single largest and most 
powerful drug trafficking organization in the Western hemisphere.”25 El 
Chapo escaped from a maximum security prison in July 2015, exposing 
the corruption in the law enforcement communities of Mexico.26 Today, 
the Gulf Cartel operates along eastern Mexico,27 and is based in the 
border city of Matamoros, with operations in Tamaulipas and Veracruz.28 
                                                     
$18 billion to $39 billion annually from sales of illicit drugs in the United States. Patrick Radden 
Keefe, Cocaine Incorporated, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 15, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/how-a-mexican-drug-cartel-makes-its-
billions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 21 “According to government figures, total homicides spiked to around 120,000 over Calderón’s 
six-year term—double the figure under the previous president, Vicente Fox.” Brianna Lee, 
Mexico’s Drug War, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Mar. 5, 2014), 
http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-drug-war/p13689. 
 22 See Mexican Army Helicopter Shot at in Drug Cartel Attack, BBC NEWS (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-32560494; see also Maria Verza, Mexican Drug 
Cartel Jalisco New Generation Flexes Muscles, YAHOO NEWS (May 2, 2015, 9:17PM), 
http://news.yahoo.com/mexican-drug-cartel-jalisco-generation-flexes-muscles-203646320.html 
 23 Sinola Cartel, INSIGHT CRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-
news/sinaloa-cartel-profile (last visited Apr. 28, 2015). 
 24 BEITTEL, supra note 19, at 11. 
 25 Jeremy Bender, Nearly Eight Years Into The Drug War, These Are Mexico’s 7 Most Notorious 
Cartels, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/mexicos-7-most-
notorious-drug-cartels-2014-10. 
 26 Catherine E. Shoichet et al., Mexican drug lord Joaquin ‘El Chapo’ Guzman escapes, CNN (July 
12, 2015, 10:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/12/world/mexico-el-chapo-escape/. 
 27 Thomas Kellner & Francisco Pipitone, Inside The Drug Wars, 27.1 WORLD POL’Y J. 29, 32 
(2010); John Burnett, Matamoros Becomes Ground Zero As Drug War Shifts On Mexican 
Border, NPR.ORG (Apr. 1, 2015), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/04/01/396581287/matamoros-becomes-ground-zero-
as-drug-war-shifts-on-mexican-border. 
 28 Patrick Corcoran, Mexico’s Shifting Criminal Landscape: Changes In Gang Operation And 
Structure In The Past Century, 16 TRENDS IN ORGANIZED CRIME 306, 320 (2013), available at 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12117-013-9190-8; Andrew V. Pestano, Mexican 
drug cartels control fate of cities of Matamoros, Reynosa, UPI.COM, 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/04/02/Mexican-drug-cartels-control-fate-of-
cities-of-Matamoros-Reynosa/4691427983673/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
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The Gulf Cartel is “one of the first cartels to turn into a mega-operation 
with a dedicated military wing that eventually mutated into Los Zetas, 
now one of the most violent criminal groups in the western 
hemisphere.”29 
Los Zetas are the most brutal and feared DTO in Mexico.30 
Originally elite Special Forces of the Mexican Army, this organization 
worked for the Gulf Cartel, breaking away in 2010 to take control of 
drug trafficking routes in Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, and throughout the 
Gulf of Mexico.31 Los Zetas also expanded operations to Guatemala.32 
Mexican authorities and the DEA have heavily targeted Los Zetas, which 
has led to the arrests and assassination of its leaders.33 
The Juárez Cartel, one of the oldest DTOs, started its drug 
trafficking operations in the 1980s.34 Once controlling one of the most 
lucrative territories along the US-Mexico border, today it is struggling to 
maintain control over its hometown as it fends off a challenge from the 
Sinaloa Cartel.35 
The founder of the Tijuana Cartel, Miguel Arellano Felix, was a 
former police officer in Sinaloa.36 This DTO, also called the Arrellano-
Felix Organization, was controlled by seven Arellano Felix brothers and 
sisters, who inherited the cartel from their uncle.37 Like the Juárez Cartel, 
the Tijuana Cartel came to prominence due to its control over one of the 
most lucrative plazas along the US-Mexico border: Tijuana.38 In 2008 
internal struggles within the cartel led the organization to break into two 
                                                     
 29 Jeremy Bender, Nearly Eight Years Into The Drug War, These Are Mexico’s 7 Most Notorious 
Cartels, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 14, 2014, 12:49 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/mexicos-7-most-notorious-drug-cartels-2014-
10#ixzz3YWjGi6t6Once. 
 30 Zetas, INSIGHT CRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/zetas-profile. 
 31 Eduardo Guerrero Gutierrez, La Estrategia Fallida, NEXOS: SOCIEDAD, CIENCIA, LITERATURA 
(Dec. 1, 2012) http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=15083; see also Jorge Gonzalez, La 
Democratizacion del Narcotrafico, 7 REVISTA ENCRUCIJADA AMERICANA 95, 97 (2014), 
available at 
http://www.encrucijadaamericana.cl/articulos/a7_n1/Articulo_6_Jorge_Gonzalez.pdf. 
 32 See Gary Moore, Mexico’s Massacre Era: Gruesome Killings, Porous Prisons, 175.3 WORLD 
AFF. J. 61, 63 (2012). 
 33 BEITTEL, supra note 19, at Summary. 
 34 Howard Campbell, No End In Sight: Violence In Juarez, 44.3 NACLA REPORT ON THE 
AMERICAS 19 (2011). 
 35 Corcoran, supra note 28, at 318. 
 36 BEITTEL, supra note 19, at 10. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Craig A. Bloom, Square Pegs And Round Holes: Mexico, Drugs, And International Law, 34.2 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 345, 358 (2012). 
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factions.39 After assassinations and arrests of the Arellano Felix brothers, 
a power vacuum opened in Tijuana into which the Sinaloa Cartel 
stepped.40 
The Knights Templar were formed in 2010 by Salvador Gomez 
Martinez, a high-ranking official of La Familia Michoacana (LFM) who 
went rogue.41 This cartel operates in the State of Michoacan.42 Initially, 
the LFM aimed at eradicating drug use in Mexico,43 but began erratically 
mixing violence with Christian evangelical beliefs and social justice 
ends.44 These particular private actors are a large part of the violence in 
Mexico and at the United States-Mexico border.45 
B. POLLEROS, COYOTES, MARAS, AND OTHER HUMAN SMUGGLERS 
Human smuggling is a major challenge for law enforcement 
around the world.46 Different networks of people—called coyotes or 
polleros in local Spanish47—specialize in smuggling undocumented 
migrants across the US-Mexico border. “Most migrants are smuggled 
across the border in trucks, although there have been cases in which the 
                                                     
 39 BEITTEL, supra note 19, at 11. 
 40 See Bloom, supra note 38, at 358–59. 
 41 Bender, supra note 29. 
 42 Jerjes Aguirre & Hugo Amador Herrera, Institutional Weakness And Organized Crime In 
Mexico: The Case Of Michoacan, TRENDS IN ORGANIZED CRIME, 221, 224 (Apr. 2013). 
 43 LARRY K. GAINES & JANINE KREMLING, DRUGS, CRIME, AND JUSTICE: CONTEMPORARY 
PERSPECTIVES 296 (2d ed., 2014), available at 
https://books.google.com/books?id=V4BIAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA296&lpg=PA296&dq=La+Famil
ia+Michoacana+eradicating+drug+use&source=bl&ots=1c0LnjlEA6&sig=Jgi9OKO_OuFfHI5L
PgeKf8v7Tmg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CF0Q6AEwCWoVChMI04LRraWJyQIVy5WICh1B8wkd
#v=onepage&q=La%20Familia%20Michoacana%20eradicating%20drug%20use&f=false (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
 44 JOHN P. SULLIVAN & ROBERT J. BUNKER, MEXICO’S CRIMINAL INSURGENCY: A SMALL WARS 
JOURNAL-EL CENTRO ANTHOLOGY 144 (2012), available at 
https://books.google.com/books?id=TQprRphYMXoC&pg=PA144&dq=La+Familia+Michoaca
na+Christian+beliefs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCkQ6AEwAmoVChMIwvjHxaaJyQIVEjqICh1gr
Qyp#v=onepage&q=La%20Familia%20Michoacana%20Christian%20beliefs&f=false (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
 45 See generally JUNE BEITTEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41576, MEXICO: ORGANIZED CRIME 
AND DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS 1, 1 (2015), available at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf. 
 46 See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Migrant Smuggling, UNODC.ORG, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/smuggling-of-migrants.html?ref=menuside 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2015). 
 47 LOIS ANN LORENTZEN, HIDDEN LIVES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 75 (2014). 
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crossing is made on foot, by rail or even through special tunnels.”48 The 
number of undocumented immigrants detained at the border may have 
dropped by 22 percent in the first four months of the current fiscal year 
compared to the previous fiscal year, which ended in 2014,49 but business 
is still booming for human traffickers. Smugglers do not risk much 
because if they are apprehended, they pretend to be immigrants. 
Authorities would usually deport them back to Mexico.50 
With increased organized crime, Mexico has “become a major 
destination for sex trafficking, as well as a transit point and supplier of 
victim to the United States.”51 Federal border authorities report that 
coyotes also kidnap, rape, and abandon their clients.52 Migrant children 
are also at risk.53 In 2014, over 57,000 unaccompanied immigrant 
children were detained in south Texas in about a one-year period.54 The 
groups involved in the human sex trafficking are part of lucrative 
prostitution rings.55 Los Zetas have branched out of their drug dealing 
business into kidnapping and sex trafficking. The cartel has also teamed 
up with Salvadorean gangs like Barrio 18 and Mara Salvatrucha.56 While 
some coyotes believe they are “providing a valuable service to those 
                                                     
 48 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Smuggling of Migrants: The Harsh Search for a Better Life, 
UNODC.ORG, http://www.unodc.org/toc/en/crimes/migrant-smuggling.html (last visited Apr. 27, 
2015). 
 49 Miriam Jordan, Number of Immigrants Apprehended at U.S.-Mexico Border Falls, WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 13, 2015, 3:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/number-of-immigrants-apprehended-at-
mexico-border-falls-1423860040. U.S. Border Patrol apprehended 97,667 undocumented 
immigrants trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border. Id. 
 50 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, supra note 48. 
 51 Ann-Marie O’Connor, Mexican cartels move into human trafficking, WASH. POST (July 27, 
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/americas/mexican-cartels-move-into-human-
trafficking/2011/07/22/gIQArmPVcI_story.html. 
 52 Todd Miller, Coyotes and Resistance on the U.S. Mexico Border, NACLA, 
https://nacla.org/news/coyotes-and-resistance-us-mexico-border (last visited Apr. 27, 2015); 
SUSAN C. PEARCE, ELIZABETH J. CLIFFORD & REENA TANDON, IMMIGRATION AND WOMEN: 
UNDERSTANDING THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 81 (2011), available at 
https://books.google.com/books?id=2xIUCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA81&dq=Mexican+coyotes+rape&
hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAGoVChMI9I3zyqeJyQIVVTKICh2lSQwW#v=onepage&q=
Mexican%20coyotes%20rape&f=false (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
 53 John Burnett, Who Is Smuggling Immigrant Children Across The Border?, NPR (July 15, 2014, 
8:03 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/07/15/331477447/who-is-smuggling-
immigrant-children-across-the-border. 
 54 Id. 
 55 O’Connor, supra note 51; Sanjuana Martinez, Nowhere to Turn: Sex Trafficking in Nuevo Leon, 
Mexico, LA JOURNADA (Aug. 14, 2011), reprinted in NACLA 
https://nacla.org/news/2011/8/25/nowhere-turn-sex-trafficking-nuevo-león-mexico (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2015). 
 56 LORENTZEN, supra note 47. 
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needing to find work north of the border,” others take advantage of 
inexperienced migrants.57 
C. BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL SERVICES INSTITUTIONS 
Banks have played an important role in the money laundering of 
drug cartel money for decades. In 1995, the US government opened an 
investigation called “Operation Casablanca,” which resulted in the arrest 
of twenty-two high-ranking and midlevel bankers from twelve banks in 
Mexico in 1998.58 US authorities found that drug traffickers used about 
one hundred US bank accounts, worth an estimated $110 million, to 
launder money. An additional $12 million were frozen on overseas bank 
accounts.59 
Over the years, major financial corporations in the United States 
have played an important role in money laundering by Mexican drug 
cartels, which operate their drug trafficking with impunity.60 There was a 
congressional hearing in 1998 on Citicorp/Citibank’s involvement in the 
drug money activities of Raúl Salinas, former senior Mexican official 
and brother of former President of Mexico Carlos Salinas de Gortari,61 
for which he was investigated and eventually sentenced in the United 
States.62 
On April 10, 2006, Mexican soldiers in Mexico City found 128 
black suitcases with 5.7 tons of cocaine, valued at $100 million, on a 
DC-9 jet.63 An investigation showed that smugglers bought the jet with 
laundered funds they transferred through one of the biggest banks in the 
                                                     
 57 David Spener, This Coyote’s Life, 33.3 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 22, 23 (Nov./Dec. 
1999). 
 58 Don Van Natta Jr., U.S. Indicts 26 Mexican Bankers in Laundering of Drug Funds, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 19, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/19/world/us-indicts-26-mexican-bankers-in-
laundering-of-drug-funds.html. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Kevin Edmonds, El Chapo’s Arrest: Money Laundering and Mexico’s Drug War, NACLA (Apr. 
25, 2014), https://nacla.org/blog/2014/4/25/el-chapos-arrest-money-laundering-and-mexicos-
drug-war. 
 61 105 CONG. REC. H3941 (daily ed. May 22, 1998) (statement of Rep. Waters). 
 62 Elisabeth Malkin, Mexico: Former President’s Brother Is Cleared in a Corruption Case, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/world/americas/mexico-former-
presidents-brother-is-cleared-in-a-corruption-case.html?ref=topics&_r=0. 
 63 ED VULLIAMY, AMEXICA: THE WAR ALONG THE BORDERLINE 345 (2011). 
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United States: Wachovia Bank (now owned by Wells Fargo Bank).64 
Wells Fargo Bank admitted in court that “its unit failed to monitor and 
report suspected money laundering by narcotics traffickers—including 
the cash used to buy four planes that shipped a total of 22 tons of 
cocaine.”65 In 2010, Wachovia Bank was once again exposed for working 
with drug cartels to launder $378.4 billion dollars from Mexican 
currency exchange houses between 2004 and 2007.66 Wells Fargo Bank, 
which by 2010 was the owner of Wachovia Bank, paid $160 million to 
settle the case.67 
Western Union was also investigated for violations of 
regulations. Court records show that investigators discovered that 
workers in more than twenty Western Union offices “allowed the 
customers to use multiple names, pass fictitious identifications and 
smudge their fingerprints on documents.”68 Western Union reached a 
settlement with the United States for $65 million and the company 
promised not to break the law again.69 In 2012, HSBC “admitted that it 
failed to apply legally required money laundering controls to $60 trillion 
in wire transfers alone, in only a three year period, $670 billion of which 
came from Mexico.”70 HSBC paid a $1.9 billion fine for the violations, 
which surpassed Wachovia’s violations and became the biggest 
violations of the Bank Secrecy Act in US history.71 
More recently, Citibank received orders from the federal 
government to improve their money laundering controls. “The action 
comes after Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) issued its concerns over anti-money 
laundering efforts at Citi subsidiaries Citibank NA and Banamex USA.”72 
                                                     
 64 Ed Villiamy, How a Big US Bank Laundered Billions from Mexico’s Murderous Drug Gangs, 
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2011, 7:04 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/03/us-
bank-mexico-drug-gangs. 
 65 Michael Smith, Banks Financing Mexico Gangs Admitted in Wells Fargo Deal, BLOOMBERG 
(June 29, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2010-06-29/banks-financing-mexico-s-
drug-cartels-admitted-in-wells-fargo-s-u-s-deal.html. 
 66 Chris Arsenault, Dirty Money Thrives Despite Mexico Drug War, AL JAZEERA (July 17, 2012, 
1:31 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/06/201261515312418850.html. 
 67 Edmonds, supra note 60. 
 68 Smith, supra note 65. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Edmonds, supra note 60. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Halah Touryalai, Fed Hits Citi Over Money Laundering Problems, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2013, 
12:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2013/03/26/fed-hits-citi-over-money-
laundering-problems/. 
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The issue became bigger when a Citigroup affiliate Banamex USA came 
under criminal investigation for money transfers across the border.73 A 
few days earlier, Citigroup admitted that its Mexican unit Banamex was 
defrauded of $400 million “in a scheme involving a financially shaky oil 
services company in Mexico.”74 The FDIC and the California 
Department of Financial Institutions ordered Banamex USA to address 
the problems with their money launder compliance program.75 
In addition, human smugglers have also used major banks to 
transfer funds for their illicit business. According to evidence in a federal 
criminal case against a gang of fifteen human smugglers, “Bank of 
America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co., and Wells Fargo have been used 
as financial conduits for the smuggling industry.”76 According to the 
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, “gangs reap $10 billion a 
year from about 3 million illegal border crossings from Mexico.”77 
Smugglers routinely detain immigrants until a family member deposits 
extra fees in a bank account for services rendered. To counter this, in 
July 2014 the Department of Homeland Security seized $625,000 in 
illicit profits “from 288 bank accounts held by human smuggling and 
drug trafficking organizations” at undisclosed banks.78 
D. CORPORATIONS 
The main beneficiaries of NAFTA in Mexico have been large 
multinational corporations, while the principal losers have been the 
country’s working class.79 After 1994, Mexico experienced high rates of 
                                                     
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Aruna Wiswanatha & David Hentry, Fed Orders Citigroup to Improve Money Laundering 
Checks, REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2013), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/26/us-
citigroup-moneylaundering-idUSBRE92P0OO20130326. 
 76 Michael Smith & Esmé E. Deprez, One Thing Gangs Smuggling Latin Migrants Over the Border 
Can’t Do Without: Big Banks, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 15, 2015), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-16/one-thing-gangs-smuggling-latin-
migrants-over-the-border-can-t-do-without-big-u-s-banks. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Press Office, Secretary Johnson Announces 192 Criminal Arrests in 
Ongoing ICE Operation to Crack Down on Human Smuggling to the Rio Grande Valley, 
DHS.GOV (July 22, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/07/22/secretary-johnson-announces-
192-criminal-arrests-ongoing-ice-operation-crack-down. 
 79 Laura Carlsen, Armoring NAFTA: Battleground For Mexico’s Future, 41 NACLA REP. ON THE 
AMERICAS 17, 18 (2008); see also Jaana Remes, A Tale of Two Mexicos: Growth and Propensity 
in a Two-Speed Economy, 14-3 PIIE BRIEFING 1, 34 (2014), available at 
http://www.piie.com/publications/briefings/piieb14-3.pdf. 
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impoverishment.80 Through NAFTA, Mexico has become the world’s 
largest exporter of cars after Germany, South Korea, and Japan.81 The 
aeronautical industry is no different. Bombardier, a Canadian company 
based in Montreal with a plant in Queretaro, Mexico, is another example 
of a corporation flourishing under regional free trade.82 The small market 
for private airplanes in Canada was not profitable enough for 
Bombardier, but NAFTA allowed it to reach bigger markets to sell and 
manufacture.83 
The US banking and financial services industries have enjoyed 
windfalls. In 2001, Citibank purchased Banamex, a Mexican bank, for 
$12.5 billion.84 In June 2001 Citibank had about 200 branches in Mexico, 
but by September 2001, after it bought Banamex, its branches increased 
to 1,560 and income grew to $124 million.85 After Citibank’s purchase in 
2001, Banamex was ranked second in assets, but first in equity, net-
income, and private sector loans in Mexico, with about one quarter of the 
market.86 Many corporations have indeed done well in the post-NAFTA 
era. 
                                                     
 80 From 1994 to 2000 the average wage decreased 21%, while the wages for the top 1% increased 
in 1999 and 2000. Carlos Salas, Mexico’s Haves And Have-Nots: NAFTA Sharpens the Divide, 
35 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 32, 34 (2002). “Mexico is the only Latin American 
country where poverty increased, going from 31% to 37% between 2005 and 2011.” Miguel 
Reyes Hernández, Humberto Morales Moreno, Miguel A. López López, & Jeorge Abascal 
Jiménez, The Denationalization of Pemex: Implications and Scope for Mexico, 5 LATIN 
AMERICAN POL’Y 133 (2014). 
 81 William Boston, Volkswagen Set To Announce Expansion of Mexico Plant, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 
2015) http://www.wsj.com/articles/volkswagen-set-to-announce-expansion-of-mexican-plant-
1425637339; see also Tony Lewis, Mexico: BMW to Build US$1bn Factory, JUST AUTO (July 4, 
2014), http://www.just-auto.com/news/bmw-to-build-us1bn-factory_id147747.aspx; see also 
Sonari Glinton, How NAFTA Drove the Auto Industry South, NPR (Dec. 8, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=249626017. 
 82 NAFTA at 20: Ready To Take Off Again?, ECONOMIST (Jan. 4, 2014) 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21592631-two-decades-ago-north-american-free-
trade-agreement-got-flying-start-then-it. 
 83 Jackie Northam, NAFTA Opened Continent For Some Canadian Companies, NPR (Dec. 25, 
2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/12/25/255381132/nafta-opened-continent-for-
some-canadian-companies. 
 84 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, INST. FOR INT’L ECON., NAFTA REVISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS AND 
CHALLENGES 203 (2005). 
 85 Barbara A. Rehm, Citi’s Giant Bite In Banamex Deal Matched Ambitions, 166 AMERICAN 
BANKER 4, 4 (Dec. 26, 2001). 
 86 Id. 
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E. PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS 
Privatizing immigration detention in the US began in 1984, when 
the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), also known as the 
“private incarceration leader,”87 cut its very first deal with the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)88 to operate immigration 
detention centers in Laredo and Houston, Texas.89 After the 9/11 attacks, 
the US concentrated its resources on making the US-Mexico border more 
secure.90 In December 2001 and March 2002 the US signed with Mexico 
the United States-Mexico Border Partnership Agreement to work on 
border security.91 In addition to the creation of agencies and partnership 
agreements, the United States increased the number of border patrol 
agents and added new technology. At the end of the Fiscal Year 2012, 
the Border Patrol had over 21,000 agents.92 
To add the new technology, the US government reached out to 
private companies that have benefited greatly with the new government 
approach.93 In 2012, Unisys signed a $132 million contract94 to create the 
                                                     
 87 Robert E. Koulish, Blackwater and the Privatization of Immigration Control, 20 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 462, 476 (2008) [hereinafter Blackwater and the Privatization of Immigration Control]. 
 88 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 
POLICY 2 (5th ed. 2009). 
 89 Blackwater and the Privatization of Immigration Control, supra note 87, at 476. 
 90 Lourdes Medrano, Is US-Mexico border Secure Enough? Immigration Reform Could Hinge on 
Answer, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 6, 2013), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2013/0306/Is-US-Mexico-border-secure-enough-
Immigration-reform-could-hinge-on-answer. 
 91 Deborah Meyers, Security at U.S. Borders: A Move Away from Unilateralism?, MIGRATION 
POLICY INST. (Aug. 1, 2003), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/security-us-borders-move-
away-unilateralism. 
 92 U.S. Customs and Border Prot., Border Patrol Overview, CBP.GOV, http://www.cbp.gov/border-
security/along-us-borders/overview (last visited Apr. 30, 2015); U.S. Customs and Border Prot., 
Technology Innovation and Acquisition, CBP.GOV, http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-
us-borders/technology-innovation-acquisition (last visited Apr. 30, 2015). “USBP staffing 
roughly doubled in the decade after the 1986 IRCA, doubled again between 1996 and the 9/11 
attacks, and doubled again in the decade after 9/11. As of September 20, 2014, the USBP had 
20,863 agents, including 18,156 posted at the Southwest border.” LISA SEGHETTI, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R42138, MEXICO’S BORDER SECURITY: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY 14 (2014), available 
at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42138.pdf. See also U.S. Customs and Border Prot., 
Border Patrol Agent Staffing by Fiscal Year, CBP.GOV (Sept. 20, 2014), 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Staffing%20FY1992-FY2014_0.pdf. 
 93 Ted Hesson, 15 Companies That Profit From Border Security, ABC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/Politics/15-companies-profit-border-
security/story?id=18957304. 
 94 Id. 
COOPER_FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2016  3:53 PM 
Vol. 33, No. 3 Private Actors Along the US-Mexico Border 115 
first pedestrian border crossing in El Paso, Texas. The crossing “deploys 
a combination of gates systems, mobile handheld devices, and radio 
frequency identification technology to more efficiently identify and 
process pedestrians crossing the border into the U.S.”95 
In 2014, Department of Homeland Security awarded EFW Inc. a 
$145 million contract “for a series of border security towers to be built 
along the Mexican border with Arizona.”96 The towers will detect, track, 
identify, and classify suspicious activity at the Arizona border. Also in 
2014, Elbit Systems Ltd. was awarded a $145 million contract for border 
surveillance technology.97 The contract had potential to reach $1 billion if 
“legislation to rewrite US immigration law passes Congress and helps 
fund the project’s expansion in the southwest.”98 Elbit Systems Ltd. is 
known for providing a border control system for the Israeli police force. 
Elbit Systems has also assisted Israel with air, sea, and land entry points 
of security.99 
In September 2006 Boeing Company was awarded by the DHS a 
three-year contract for the construction of SBInet.100 The US government 
paid Boeing an estimated $860 million for the project.101 “SBInet was to 
be deployed over 387 miles of the Southwest border by the end of 
2008.”102 Soon after the project was started, it experienced several 
problems: “Despite more than a dozen Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) reports warning of serious SBInet deficiencies, senior 
                                                     
 95 Unisys, Customs and Border Protection Opens Pedestrian Border Crossing System in El Paso 
with Support from Unisys, UNISYS (Nov. 10, 2011), 
http://www.unisys.com/news/News%20Release/Customs-and-Border-Protection-Opens-
Pedestrian-Border-Crossing-System-in-El-Paso-with-Support-from-Unisys. 
 96 Fox News Latino, Homeland Security Awards $145 Million Contract For U.S.-Mexico Border 
Towers, LATINO.FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 1, 2014), 
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2014/03/01/homeland-security-awards-145-million-
contract-for-us-mexico-border-towers/. 
 97 Kathleen Miller, Israel’s Elbit Wins U.S. Border Work After Boeing Dumped, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 
27, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-27/israel-s-elbit-wins-u-s-border-
surveillance-contract. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Griff Witte, Boeing Wins Deal for Border Security, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/19/AR2006091901715.html. 
 101 GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Controls over Contractor Payments for the Technology 
Component Need Improvement, WASHINGTON, DC: GAO 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1168.pdf. 
 102 Doris Meissner, Donald M. Kerwin, Muzzaffar Chishti, & Claire Bergeron, Immigration 
Enforcement In The United States: The Rise Of A Formidable Machinery, MIGRATION POL’Y 
INST. 29, Jan. 2013, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-
enforcement-united-states-rise-formidable-machinery [hereinafter Meissner, et al.]. 
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administration official and members of Congress continued to back the 
SBInet program through 2009.”103 In 2010, the GAO pointed out that 
Boeing had discovered 1,300 defects in the project between March 2008 
and July 2009, and that more problems continued to come up at a fast 
pace.104 In 2010, the DHS held back the funding for the project, and in 
January of 2011 Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano ended 
the funding for the SBInet project.105 
CCA is currently “the biggest operator of private prisons in the 
world.”106 The company made about $1.7 billion in revenues in 2012. A 
quarter of the revenue (an estimated $425 million) “came from contract 
with the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and federal 
Bureau of Prisons to incarcerate non-citizens in the United States.”107 
After the US government decided to end the transportation 
services by the Customs and Border Protection (CBP), it awarded the 
contract to G4S.108 G4S currently has over 600 Custom Protection 
Officers operating over 100 vehicles used to transport undocumented 
immigrants who were are trying to cross the US-Mexico border.109 On 
August 22, 2013, G4S was awarded a $234 million contract by US 
Customs and Border Protection for the transportation of detainees in the 
Southwest border.110 
In 2012, there were several other companies contracted with the 
US government to provide security services or technology at the US-
Mexico border.111 International Business Machines contracted for 
                                                     
 103 Id. at 29. 
 104 Id. 
 105 CNN Wire Staff, Homeland Security Chief Cancels Costly Virtual Border Fence, CNN (Jan. 14, 
2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/01/14/border.virtual.fence/. 
 106 Lee Fang, How Private Prisons Game the Immigration System, NATION (Feb. 27, 2013), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/173120/how-private-prisons-game-immigration-system. 
 107 Id. 
 108 G4S USA, The Bus No One Wants to Catch, G4S.US, 
http://www.g4s.com/~/media/Files/USA/PDF-Case-
Studies/Customs%20and%20Border%20Patrol%20112311%20FINAL.ashx (last visited Apr. 30, 
2015). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Fed. Bus. Opportunity, Southwest Border Transportation, Medical Escort and Guard Services, 
FBO.GOV (Aug. 22, 2013), 
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=91edd01479626bfcaf64a03d99649c
3a&tab=core&_cview=1. 
 111 Ted Hesson, 15 Companies that Profit from Border Security, ABC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/Politics/15-companies-profit-border-
security/story?id=18957304. 
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information technology and telecommunications for $100 million.112 
Pacific Architects & Engineers contracted for the operational systems 
development for $97 million.113 Science Applications International 
Corporation contracted for equipment maintenance, office building 
repair, and information technology services for $69 million.114 ESCgov 
contracted to provide office information system equipment for $54 
million.115 
These are some of the private companies benefiting from the 
increase in security at the US-Mexico border. Now with the end of two 
wars, private security contractors “are turning their sights to the Mexican 
border in the hopes of collecting some of the billions of dollars expected 
to be spent on tighter security if immigration legislation becomes law.”116 
F. THE BORDER VIGILANTES 
It is not just private corporations that work to beef up security 
along the US-Mexico border, but also private individuals and their 
loosely organized affiliates. A state of tension between Anglos and 
Mexicans along the US-Mexico border dates back to the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848, when Mexico sold California, 
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas to the United States for 15 million 
dollars.117 Between 1848 and 1928, 597 Mexicans were lynched by US-
based vigilante mobs.118 Mexicans faced danger during those years, with 
the rates of lynching against Mexicans far surpassing those against 
African Americans in the South. The last recorded lynching of a Mexican 
in the United States took place on November 16, 1928.119 Even after the 
                                                     
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Eric Lipton, As Wars End, a Rush to Grab Dollars Spent on the Border, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 
2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/us-military-firms-eye-border-
security-contracts.html. 
 117 Jessica Conaway, Reversion Back to a State of Nature in the United States Southern 
Borderlands: A Look at Potential Causes of Action to Curb Vigilante Activity on the United 
States/Mexican Border, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1419, 1422 (2005). 
 118 William D. Carrigan & Clive Webb, When Americans Lynched Mexicans, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/20/opinion/when-americans-lynched-
mexicans.html?_r=0. 
 119 William D. Carrigan & Clive Webb, The Lynching of Persons of Mexican Origin or Descent in 
the United States, 1848 to 1928, 37 J. SOC. HIST. 411, 414 (2003); see Steven W. Bender, Sight, 
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arrival of the US law enforcement officials and courts of law, vigilantes 
continued with their own extra-judicial system: “These mobs in fact 
often showed disdain for the due process of law by taking suspects from 
police custody and lynching them.”120 It is as if little has changed over 
the last 125 years: “[a]fter the terrorist attacks against the United States 
on September 11, 2001, Cochise County became ground zero for the 
organizing of armed civilians and vigilantes dedicated to patrolling the 
southeastern Arizona side of the US border for undocumented 
migrants.”121 By 2005, the news media focused on the increasing 
numbers of self-described patriots taking up arms to protect the United 
States from the seemingly unending wave of illegal immigrants coming 
north from Mexico.122 Donning military fatigues, these border vigilantes 
took to their motor homes to help patrol the US border with Mexico and 
protect the homeland.123 Some of these vigilante groups use names 
associated with the US government including “Friends of the Border 
Patrol” and “American Border Patrol”.124 They have also attempted “to 
resemble US Customs and US Border Patrol agents by wearing military 
attire that bears similar insignia.”125 
Armed with handguns, walkie-talkies, and night-vision goggles, 
they spread out along the border region from Texas through California, 
                                                     
Sound, and Stereotypes: The War on Terrorism and Its Consequences for Latinas/os, 81 OR. L. 
REV. 1153, 1173 (2002). 
 120 Peter Yoxall, The Minuteman Project, Gone in a Minute or Here to Stay? The Origin, History, 
and Future of Citizen Activism on the United States-Mexico Border, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. 
REV. 524 (2006). 
 121 EMMANUEL BRUNET-JAILLY, BORDERLANDS: COMPARING BORDER SECURITY IN NORTH 
AMERICA AND EUROPE 49 (2007). 
 122 Civil Homeland Defense had been founded in 2002 and in April 2005 changed its name to the 
Minutemen Project. See Bradley McCombs, AZ-based Border Minuteman Group Call it Quits, 
ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Mar. 25, 2010, available at http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/az-based-
border-minuteman-group-calls-it-quits/article_7d47c702-378b-11df-95cb-001cc4c03286.html. 
 123 According to the mission statement from the Minuteman Civil Defense Corp., “[t]o secure the 
United States borders and costal boundaries against unlawful and unauthorized entry of all 
individuals, contraband, and foreign military.” See MINUTEMANHQ.COM, 
http://www.minutemanhq.com/hq/aboutus.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2015). 
 124 See generally Stephen R. Vina et al., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33353, CIVILIAN PATROLS 
ALONG THE BORDER: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES (2006), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33353.pdf. 
 125 Adalgiza A. Nùñez, Civilian Border Patrols: Activists, Vigilantes, or Agents of Government?, 60 
RUTGERS L. REV. 797, 810 (2008). 
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with a majority situating themselves in southern Arizona.126 Jim Gilchrist, 
a co-founder of the Minutemen Project, explained: 
The primary goal of the Minuteman Project is to bring national 
awareness to the illegal alien invasion of the United States. In a span 
of only two years, with a paltry purse of public donations, the 
Minuteman Project has brought more attention to the illegal alien 
crisis than many larger and longer-established immigration law 
advocacy groups have done in 25 years with aggregate donations of 
an estimated $20 million. The Minuteman Project’s secondary goal is 
to advocate for the enforcement of the U.S. immigration laws 
currently in place and to encourage the enactment of new 
immigration laws to close perceived “loopholes” in existing 
legislation.”127 
The Southern Law Poverty Center calls these groups “nativist extremist,” 
designating a few as “hate groups.”128 The US government and its federal 
law enforcement officials have been forced to work out rules of 
procedure with these groups concerning the apprehension of suspected 
undocumented immigrants.129 Since its height in 2006, the border 
vigilante movement has continuously dissipated.130 The Southern Poverty 
Law Center reported that the numbers of nativist extremist groups 
dropped greatly by 2011.131 In 2014, however, in response to the massive 
flood of immigrants from Central America to the US-Mexico border 
including tens of thousands of unaccompanied minors132 from Honduras, 
El Salvador, and Guatemala, there were an estimated ten armed groups 
                                                     
 126 See e.g., Tim Steller, Blog: How Border-militia Members Got a Bad Name, ARIZ. DAILY STAR 
(June 21, 2012), http://azstarnet.com/news/blogs/senor-reporter/blog-how-border-militia-
members-got-a-bad-name/article_9f99e6b0-bb22-11e1-bcb9-001a4bcf887a.html 
 127 Jim Gilchrist, An Essay by Jim Gilchrist, 22 GEO. IMM. L.J. 415, 416 (2008). 
 128 Intelligence Report, Spring 2007, Issue No. 25, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2007/spring/shoot-
shovel-shut-up/the-groups-a-lis (last visited Oct. 28, 2010). 
 129 Yoxall, supra note 120, at 37. 
 130 See Tim Steller, Report: Border-watch Groups Vanishing, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Mar. 18, 2012), 
http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/report-border-watch-groups-vanishing/article_439813ad-
d091-5b9c-8788-20ace8c2003a.html. 
 131 Mark Potok, The “Patriot” Movement Explodes, S. POVERTY LAW CTR. (Mar. 1, 2012), 
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2012/patriot-movement-explodes; see 
also James Duff Lyall, Vigilante State: Reframing the Minuteman Project in American Politics 
and Culture, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 275 (2009). 
 132 Some 57,000 minors were apprehended by the Border Patrol in a mere 10-month period. See 
Border Vigilante Calls Attention to Adults Entering U.S. Illegally, WBUR BOSTON NPR (Aug. 1, 
2014), http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2014/08/01/border-vigilante-texas. 
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monitoring the border along the Texas portion of the border with 
Mexico.133 
In short, there is a plethora of private actors operating in the 
border region—some of them for-profit and legitimate (private 
contractors), some of them for-profit and illegal (drug cartels and human 
smugglers), some of them not-for-profit (border vigilantes, Good 
Samaritans, and other relief non-governmental organizations). 
II. THE REASONS FOR THE PROLIFERATION OF PRIVATE ACTORS 
This Part explores the reasons for the proliferation of private 
actors along the US-Mexico border. While we cannot presume that all 
the private actors are operating from the same imperative, economic need 
is often the overwhelming driving force behind their operations. 
Professor Martti Koskenniemi writes of “homo economicus, poised to 
perpetuate the realization of its idiosyncratic preferences. Such actors are 
completely controlled by the environmental conditions that make 
interest-fulfillment possible.”134 
There indeed exists such a strong profit motive for many private 
actors at the border.135 Drug cartels want to access the United States to 
sell their illicit products. Human smugglers profit from guiding 
undocumented immigrants into the United States for high fees (an 
                                                     
 133 See Kolten Parker, Armed Militia Purportedly Along the Border, HOUSTON CHRON. (July 28, 
2014), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Armed-militia-
purportedly-along-the-border-5652531.php; see also Border Vigilante Calls Attention to Adults 
Entering U.S. Illegally, supra note 132. 
 134 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 256 (2011). 
 135 It is important to note that there are individuals and groups along the border not in it for profit. 
There are good Samaritans, including the Border Angels, Casa Cornelia Law Center, American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Human Borders, American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), 
Project Rescue, and other Latino and religiously based non-governmental organizations. These 
groups operate on the peripheries—both literally and metaphorically—of the U.S.-Mexico 
border, providing food, shelter, medial aid, and legal assistance and lobbying efforts for 
undocumented people crossing into the United States. They are all not for profit, and rely on the 
donations of charitable foundations and donors as well as some government grants for some. 
Where the US authorities are unable, or unwilling, to provide succor to those risking life and 
limb to cross into the United States, they have stepped in to provide much needed humanitarian 
relief. One other project, involving the ACLU, National Lawyers Guild, and La Raza Lawyers 
Association of San Diego, monitored the activities of the border vigilantes. See Leslie 
Berenstein, Legal Groups to Watch County “Minutemen”, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, July 1, 
2005, available at http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/news/mexico/tijuana/20050701-9999-
7m1watch.html. 
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estimated $5,000 a head is charged by some coyotes).136 Border factory 
owners in Mexico want to take advantage of tax incentives, duty 
drawbacks, and the proximity to the US marketplace.137 Multinational 
corporations operating in the United States want to win high-paying 
contracts from the Department of Homeland Security to beef up border 
security138 and to sell goods and services to the Mexican government.139 
US border vigilantes are motivated for profit in the sense that they are 
protecting US jobs against low cost labor from Mexico and Central 
America competing for work.140 Migrants, too, are motivated by 
money.141 They are seeking better-paying work (or any work at all given 
the high levels of unemployment or underemployment in their respective 
countries).142 A majority of these unauthorized immigrants are coming to 
                                                     
 136 “The migrants pay anywhere from $4,000 to $10,000 each for the illegal journey across 
thousands of miles in the care of smuggling networks that in turn pay off government officials, 
gangs operating on trains and drug cartels controlling the routes north.” Associated Press, From 
Bribing Drug Cartels and Immigration Officials to Paying for Hotels and Train Rides: Coyote 
Smugglers Reveal Costs Involved in Smuggling Child Migrant from Central America to the U.S., 
DAILYMAIL (July 22, 2014, 12:12 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2700946/From-bribing-drug-cartels-immigration-officials-paying-hotels-train-rides-Coyote-
smugglers-reveal-costs-involved-smuggling-child-migrants-Central-America-U-S.html. 
 137 “Corporations are Homo economicus. Quite rationally and without malice, they try to increase 
their profits by any means, legal and occasionally illegal. Corporations that don’t follow this 
cardinal law of the jungle will go out of business, which means that whatever else a corporation 
makes, it’ll invariably produce externalities.” RAJ PATEL, THE VALUE OF NOTHING: HOW TO 
RESHAPE MARKET SOCIETY AND REDEFINE DEMOCRACY 48 (2009) (citing JUAN MARTINEZ-
ALIER, THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR: A STUDY OF ECOLOGICAL CONFLICTS AND 
VALUATION (2002)). 
 138 Blackwater and the Privatization of Immigration Control, supra note 87, at 466; see also Tom 
Turpel, New Detention & Deportation Laws Workshop Explores Ideas About Immigration 
Reform, NEW AM. MEDIA (2006), 
http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=c0a0c68318740d85860634
6e49703ecb (stating that when former President George Bush announced that more spending 
should go towards detention facilities, share prices for CCA increased by 27%). 
 139 Reuters, PeopleSoft to Update Mexico’s Tax System, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2004), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/aug/06/business/fi-rup6.8. 
 140 “America still has millions of less-educated and /or low skilled workers to compete for the only 
jobs that immigrants are qualified to take. When immigrants are willing to work at below-market 
wages, many without benefits or employment taxes paid by employers, they place a squeeze on 
the bottom tiers of American workers.” JIM GILCHRIST & JEROME R. CORSI, MINUTEMEN: THE 
BATTLE TO SECURE AMERICA’S BORDERS 80 (2006). 
 141 See Demetrios Papademetriou & Aaron Terrazas, Immigrants in the United States and the 
Current Economic Crisis, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 1, 
2009), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrants-united-states-and-current-economic-
crisis. 
 142 Income maximization explains why the more educated are more likely to emigrate (positive 
selection) and more educated migrants are more likely to settle in destination countries with high 
rewards to skill (positive sorting). See generally Jeffrey Grogger & Gordon H. Hanson, Income 
Maximization and the Selection and Sorting of International Migrants, 95 J. DEV. ECON. 42 
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the United States to make money to send home to their families in the 
developing world.143 
These private actors can fill a void left by borders that are not 
fully regulated. When borders are contested, profiteers move in. 
The U.S.-Mexican border, for example, has long been the subject of 
negative stereotypes by both the United States and Mexico. The 
1920s saw the border depicted as a haven for gambling, prostitution, 
and vice, an image that has continued while other layers have been 
added. In the 1980s and 1990s, the border was frequently decried as a 
center of worker exploitation in assembly plants (maquiladoras), 
serious environmental problems, and out-of-control urban growth. 
The flow of illicit drugs across the border to consumers in the United 
States has produced the perception of a region characterized by drug 
wars and corruption.144 
In addition to the sense of lawlessness that border regions 
generally provide,145 it is important to recognize that the border has not 
yet been fully demarcated.146After all, the United States won this territory 
through military conquest. This situation was solidified in and by the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, an agreement which saw Mexico 
cede a huge portion of its national territory—what is present-day 
Arizona, California, New Mexico, parts of Colorado, Nevada, and 
Utah—to the United States. Notwithstanding this treaty, Samuel Truett 
explains that: “this land was contested and selectively unmade as social 
conflict and revolutionary struggles shook the foundations of the modern 
borderlands, dashing dreams of domestication and domination and 
conjuring the ghosts of frontiers past.”147 (Italics added). 
                                                     
(2011), available at 
http://gps.ucsd.edu/_files/faculty/hanson/hanson_publication_migration_income.pdf. 
 143 “In the United States last year [2012], more than $120 billion was sent by workers to families 
abroad—making it the largest sender of remittances in the world. More than $23 billion went to 
Mexico, $13.45 billion to China, $10.84 billion to India and $10 billion to the Philippines, 
among other recipients.” Simon Tomlinson, Revealed: How Immigrants in America Are Sending 
$120 BILLION to their Struggling Families Back Home, DAILYMAIL (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2271455/Revealed-How-immigrants-America-sending-
120-BILLION-struggling-families-home.html. 
 144 PAUL GANSTER & DAVID E. LOREY, THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY, at xxi (2d ed. 2008). 
 145 See generally TED CONOVER, COYOTES: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE SECRET WORLD OF 
AMERICA’S ILLEGAL ALIENS (1987). 
 146 See 50 Years Ago, A Fluid Border Made the U.S. 1 Square Mile Smaller, NPR (Sept. 25, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/09/25/350885341/50-years-ago-a-fluid-border-made-the-u-s-1-square-
mile-smaller. 
 147 Samuel Truett, in Fugitive Landscapes, shows “how Mexicans and Americans tried but 
ultimately failed to domesticate Sonora and Arizona in the years before the coming of the 
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On the Mexican side, the state did not exercise a lot of control of 
the area, be it in criminal justice, regional trade, and international 
relations: “[a]s the colonies failed to flourish, border defenses were 
primarily left to state of local governments. In the absence of a strong 
central government, a few men known as caciques, or caudillos, took 
hold of state governments and rules with almost autonomy from Mexico 
City.”148 
Nothing much has changed. Mexican authorities struggle to 
maintain effective control as police come under attack on a seemingly 
frequent basis.149 The state does not enjoy a monopoly of force.150 
A. CARTEL BEHAVIOR 
With unregulated revenue from the illicit drugs trade worth an 
estimated $30 to $50 billion annually,151 it is no surprise that law 
enforcement officials, security forces, and political leaders are 
corrupted.152 Many public servants—judges, law enforcement agents, and 
                                                     
railroad.” SAMUEL TRUETT, FUGITIVE LANDSCAPES: THE FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF THE U.S.-
MEXICO BORDERLANDS 9 (2006). See also OSCAR J. MARTÍNEZ, BORDER PEOPLE: LIFE AND 
SOCIETY IN THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDERLANDS 5–10 (1994). 
 148 RACHEL ST. JOHN, LINE IN THE SAND 42 (2011). 
 149 Jo Tuckman, Fifteen Mexican Police Officers Killed in Deadly Ambush in Jalisco State, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/07/mexico-police-
attack-jalisco-15-dead; Dudley Althaus, Mexico Cartel Kills 15 Police in Ambush, WALL. ST. J., 
Apr. 8, 2015, at A9, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/drug-gang-kills-15-officers-in-
mexico-142845048. 
 150 See E. Eduardo Castillo, Ambush That Killed 15 Police in Western Mexico Could Signal Cartel’s 
Offensive Against State, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 8, 2015), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/04/08/ambush-that-killed-15-police-in-
western-mexico-a-rarity. 
 151 Council on Hemispheric Affairs, The Future of Mexico’s Drug Strategy, COHA.ORG, (Aug. 5, 
2015), http://www.coha.org/the-future-of-mexicos-drug-strategy/; Sandy Goodman, Mexico 
Drug War a Lost Cause as Presently Fought, HUFF. POST (Mar. 10, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sandy-goodman/mexico-drug-war-a-lost-ca_b_833097.html; Cf. 
“According to U.S. authorities, drug trafficking organizations send between $19 and $29 billion 
annually to Mexico from the United States, though the Government of Mexico disputes this 
figure.” BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
2013 INCSR: COUNTRIES/JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY CONCERN–GUATEMALA THROUGH 
MEXICO (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2013/vol2/204066.htm; John 
Burnett, Awash in Cash, Drug Cartels Rely On Big Banks to Launder Profits, NPR (Mar. 20, 
2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/03/20/291934724/awash-in-cash-drug-cartels-
rely-on-big-banks-to-launder-profits. 
 152 See BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, supra note 151; Awash in 
Cash, supra note 151. 
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elected officials—are in the employ of the narco-traffickers.153 “[Drug 
trafficking] is an illegal form of capitalist accumulation. In some cases, it 
is an almost caricatured celebration of consumerism and wealth—narco-
mansions, big trucks, expensive tasteless clothing, gaudy jewelry—
facilitated by neoliberalism and collusion with elements of the state.”154 
The control over plazas means that profits increase. 
[T]he cartelization is territorial, which induces wars among the 
cartels for control of space. Moreover, since the cartels do not pay 
rent or property taxes, their costs involve the costs of the violence, 
rather the normal carrying cost of rentals and mortgages. One could 
call the gains from controlling territory a “drug rent.”155 
Loads, both of the legal and illegal kind, transported by truck are 
hijacked by other cartels or subject to “taxes” by corrupt police or 
military officers.156 The closer to the border, the more control the cartels 
                                                     
 153 There is much corruption in Mexico according to Transparencia Mexicana’s 2010 Corruption 
Report. In 2010, an estimated 200 million acts of corruption occurred in the country.  In 2007, 
this was estimated to be 197 million. In 2010, bribes cost each Mexican citizen an average of 
$165 Mexican pesos.  In 2007, this average was $138 Mexican pesos.  Clearly, corruption and 
perceptions of corruption continue to proliferate. In fact, Mexico remains the lowest rated 
country for the perception of corruption of the member countries of the OECD. See generally 
TRANSPARENCIA MEXICANA, ÍNDICE NACIONAL DE CORRUPCIÓN Y BUEN GOBIERNO–INFORME 
EJECUTIVO 2010 [National Index of Corruption and Good Government–Executive Report] 
(2010) (Mex.), available at http://www.tm.org.mx/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/INFORME_EJECUTIVO_INCBG2010.pdf/. There is also evidence of 
U.S. agents on the payroll of the cartels: “U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data 
indicate that arrests of CBP employees for corruption-related activities since fiscal years 2005 
account for less than 1 percent of CBP’s entire workforce per fiscal year.” U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-59, BORDER SECURITY: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO 
STRENGTHEN CBP EFFORTS TO MITIGATE RISK OF EMPLOYEE CORRUPTION AND MISCONDUCT, 
Abstract (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650505.pdf. 
 154 HOWARD CAMPBELL, DRUG WAR ZONE: FRONTLINE DISPATCHES FROM THE STREETS OF EL 
PASO AND JUÁREZ 9 (2009). “The war in Mexico is for drugs and the enormous money to be 
made by supplying American habits, a torrent of cash that the army, the police, the government, 
and the cartels all lust for.” CHARLES BOWDEN, MURDER CITY: CIUDAD JUÁREZ AND THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY’S NEW KILLING FIELDS 202 (2010). 
 155 Fred E. Foldvary, The Foreign Economic Effect of the U.S. War on Drugs, 91 OR. L. REV. 1129, 
1132–33 (2013). 
 156 “[T]he Mexican army is a government-financed criminal organization, a fact which Mexicans 
learn as children.” CHARLES BOWDEN, MURDER CITY: CIUDAD JUÁREZ AND THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY’S NEW KILLING FIELDS 202 (2010); CAMPBELL, supra note 154, at 23 (“Typically, a 
cartel purchases the loyalty of the head of the federal police or the military commander in a 
particular district. This official provides officers or soldiers to physically protect drug loads in 
transit or in stage facilities, and in some cases to serve as bodyguards for high-level cartel 
members. Police on the cartel payroll intimidate, kidnap or murder opponents of the 
organization, although they also may pressure and extort larger payments from the cartel with 
which they are associated.) 
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need to exert.157 The same can be surmised for human trafficking, with 
some people paying up to $6,000 each to cross the US-Mexico border. 
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “migrant 
smuggling is a highly profitable business in which criminals enjoy low 
risk detection and punishment.”158 
B. CORPORATIONS FIND A PLACE TO MANUFACTURE AND FROM WHICH 
TO EXPORT 
Proximity to the US marketplace is important for the profitability 
of legitimate businesses. There are many incentives for Mexican 
factories to set up as close to the US border as possible.159 Multinational 
corporations first came to the northern part of Mexico in 1965 as part of 
the Mexican government’s Border Industrialization Program to take 
advantage of the proximity to the US-Mexico border and because of a 
number of tax incentives. Maquiladoras in border cities like Ciudad 
Juarez and Tijuana supplied manufactured goods—automotive parts, 
televisions, and computers to name just three ubiquitous consumer 
products—to the American consumer.160 The “foreign-owned plants that 
use cheap Mexican labor to assemble imported materials then send the 
finished product back to countries such as the United States, paying tax 
only on value added by the cheap labor.”161 
                                                     
 157 See Gun Battle Kills Three in Mexican Border City of Reynosa, BBC NEWS (Apr. 18, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-32363587. 
 158 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, Migrant Smuggling, UNODC, 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/smuggling-of-migrants.html (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2015). 
 159 “It remains the case, however, that tensions which arise between making a profit, on the one 
hand, and social responsibility, on the other, are still primarily left to be resolved through free 
markets. But free markets can and do fail. International ground rules are needed to promote the 
benefits of corporate activity, as a form of cooperative enterprise, while at the same time 
restraining and mitigating the worst effects of unhindered consumerism and corporate greed. The 
market alone demonstrably cannot achieve this.” ALICE DE JONGE, TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE GLOBAL BUSINESS 
ENVIRONMENT 27 (2011).  
 160 “Just south of the United States, Mexico’s border towns witnessed the growth of the 
manufacturing model at the end of the twentieth century. In 1969, Mexico ranks first among 
manufacturing-assembly countries. By 1996, 372 of these businesses employed nearly 222,000 
laborers, primarily in the automotive and electronics sectors.” SERGIO GONZÁLEZ RODRÍGUEZ, 
THE FEMICIDE MACHINE 26 (2012). 
 161 Debbie Nathan, Work, Sex and Danger in Ciudad Juárez, NACLA REP. AMS., Nov./Dec. 1999, 
at 24, 24. 
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After the implementation of NAFTA, US and Canadian 
companies experienced several benefits from importing and exporting 
products through the maquiladora system in Mexico, such as the ability 
to avoid paying value-added taxes, avoid some non-tariff restrictions, 
and avoid temporary importation (duty free).162 NAFTA also provided 
extra duty drawbacks for products that contained components from other 
NAFTA partner countries. However, Mexico went through a series of tax 
changes in January 1, 2014, which posed challenges to those who benefit 
from maquiladoras’ tax breaks.163 To placate factory owners, President 
Enrique Peña Nieto granted other tax benefits in early 2014, some 
temporary and others permanently.164 
Major corporations have long done well in Mexico due to the 
country’s long history of rewarding friends of the government with 
protected industries—free from competition from the outside.165 After all, 
Mexico joined the GATT only in 1986 during the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.166 
                                                     
 162 See Alejandro García Seimandi, Maquiladora and PITEX Programs: Trying to Improve the 
Obstacles, 12 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 121, 126 (2004). 
 163 Leonie Barrie, Mexico: Tax Law Poses Challenges to Maquilas, JUST-STYLE (Jan. 31, 2014), 
http://www.just-style.com/news/new-tax-law-poses-challenges-to-maquilas_id120540.aspx. 
Maquiladoras were then required to pay VAT on their imports under the Mexican tax reform. 
Sandler & Travis Trade Advisory, New Mexican Tax Law Poses Significant Challenges to 
Maquila Operations (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.strtrade.com/news-news-New-Mexican-Tax-
Law-Significant-Challenges-Maquila-Operations.html. Under the tax reform, “temporary 
imports were going to be subject to a 16 percent VAT, which generally is fully creditable but 
only for one month after such VAT is paid,” which typically results in the right to a tax refund. 
Eugenio Grageda Nuñez, Value Added Tax (VAT): Impacts on the Maquiladora Industry Began 
Jan. 1, 2015, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 27, 2015), available at 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/value-added-tax-impacts-maquiladora-industry-began-jan-
1-2015-0. 
 164 Maquiladoras could apply a tax benefit that provides an additional deduction relating to tax-
exempt employee benefits payments, tax payers that complied with certain formalities were 
given a “2-year period to fulfill the requirement of a 30% foreign ownership of the machinery 
and equipment (M&E) used in the maquila operation,” and reduced income tax rates in place 
from 2003 and 2013. Mexico: Presidential Decree Published Providing Tax Benefits for 
Maquiladoras, PWC, at 1 (Jan. 17, 2014), available at https://www.pwc.com/us/en/tax-
services/publications/insights/assets/pwc-tp-mexico-tax-incentives-maquiladoras.pdf. 
 165 Andrew Bast, Crony Capitalism in Emerging Markets, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 16, 2010), 
http://www.newsweek.com/crony-capitalism-emerging-markets-71795; See also Eric Martin & 
Brendan Case, Mexico’s President Can’t Shake Cronyism Doubts After Probe, BLOOMBERG 
(Aug. 23, 2015, 5:51 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-23/mexico-s-
president-can-t-shake-cronyism-doubts-after-probe. 
 166 Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2015); see 
also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194. 
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Notwithstanding the obligation to liberalize trade and allow for foreign 
competition, Mexico has been described as a “captured state,”167 meaning 
that: 
[t]he Mexican state is confronted with very strong private interests in 
sectors such as telecommunications, banking, cement and others, 
which the state is incapable of controlling. To a large extent, these 
companies or groups force the state to define regulatory conditions in 
their sectors so as to be favorable to their private interests rather than 
to the public at large.168 
Hence, the regulatory institutions empowered to control these companies 
remain weak and unable to do their work or even controlled by the 
powerful corporations.169 
C. LIBERALIZATION: THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
AND THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDER 
The North American Free Trade Agreement170 (NAFTA) 
attempted to make some of the US-Mexico border less of a contested site 
and open up Mexico’s traditionally protected industries. The border 
between the United States and Mexico was a large part of the grand plan 
to better align the countries’ commerce.171 By using US technology, 
millions of goods could be produced by less expensive labor in Mexico 
for export to and consumption in the United States. All of the North 
American continent would become part of the same supply chain, 
                                                     
 167 See generally WORLD BANK, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN MEXICO: BEYOND STATE CAPTURE 
AND SOCIAL POLARIZATION 37–53 (2007). 
 168 BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, BTI 2014 MEXICO COUNTRY REPORT 9 (2014), available at 
http://www.bti-project.de/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Mexico.pdf. 
 169 “Regulation is needed to overcome and minimize the negative externalities that corporate 
activity produces because corporations cannot be expected to minimize their own negative 
externalities.  It also stands to reason that to the extent that the negative externalities of corporate 
activity are global in nature, then the laws aimed at minimizing them need to be global in nature 
as well.” DE JONGE, supra note 159, at 27. 
 170 NAFTA, Can.-Mex.-U.S., supra note 4. Congress approved NAFTA by means of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103–182, 107 Stat. 2057 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3311 (2006)). NAFTA became effective on January 1, 1994. Exec. 
Order No. 12889, 58 Fed. Reg. 69681 (Dec. 27, 1993). 
 171  “NAFTA was a brave new world for the three governments.” David A. Gantz, The Evolution of 
U.S. Views on FTA Investment Protection: From NAFTA to the United States-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement, in THE FIRST DECADE OF NAFTA: THE FUTURE OF FREE TRADE IN NORTH AMERICA 
503, 507 (Kevin C. Kennedy ed., 2004). 
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enjoying just in time production and the comparative advantage that 
comes with such a liberalized trade regime.172 
NAFTA was also a boon for many corporations, particularly the 
large, multinational ones.173 It increased trade through tariff reduction, 
but also the integration of the production process—so that now some 40 
percent of Mexican exports to the United States actually contain US-
made components. There is a supply chain that is transnational, as it 
relies of production in both countries along the US-Mexico border. Duty 
drawbacks allow for a fully integrated supply chain in the three partner 
countries and a truly regionally integrated inventory management (“just 
in time”) system. 
Foreign companies seized the opportunity to find cheap labor, 
especially with the implementation of NAFTA in 1994.174 Mexico’s 
strategic advantage was the surplus value that could be extracted from 
each worker—hence, larger profits were possible: “[m]anufacturing-
assembly along the Mexican border exists as an ultra-contemporary 
technological enclave in the midst of a degraded environment.”175 
Soon after NAFTA went into effect, Mexico’s trade increased 
17.5 percent with the United States and 33.3 percent with Canada.176 
Additionally, exports, imports, and foreign investment increased in the 
country.177 President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who negotiated NAFTA 
during his administration, publicly proclaimed the neoliberal policy as a 
step forward for Mexico.178 President Vicente Fox, who took office in 
                                                     
 172 See generally MAXWELL A. CAMERON & BRIAN W. TOMLIN, THE MAKING OF NAFTA: HOW 
THE DEAL WAS DONE (2000). 
 173 See Carrie Kahn, How NAFTA Helped the Mexican Billionaires’ Club, NPR (Dec. 31, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/01/01/258668414/how-nafta-helped-the-mexican-billionaires-club; see 
also William Mauldin, Pacific Trade Deals Likely to Have Narrow Reach; Most Americans 
Wouldn’t Notice a Big Impact From the Trans-Pacific Partnership, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2015), 
at A2, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-the-trans-pacific-partnership-wouldand-
wouldntdo-1426441618 (“Sweeping trade deals of the past—with Canada and Mexico in 1993, 
for instance, or China in 2000—presented big upsides and big risks for a broad swath of U.S. 
companies.”) 
 174 Nathan, supra note 161, at 24. 
 175 RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 160, at 30. 
 176 Chris Olive, Member States Developments: Mexico, 1 NAFTA LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 122, 122 
(1995). 
 177 Id. 
 178 Laura Carlsen, Armoring NAFTA: The Battleground for Mexico’s Future, NACLA REP. AMS., 
Sept./Oct. 2008, at 17, 18. 
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2000, also considered NAFTA a success while he was in office.179 So, 
too, do Presidents Felipe Calderón and Enrique Pena-Nieto.180 
It is not just companies that are doing business in Mexico that 
are thriving. Companies that attempt to do business there and elsewhere 
in the NAFTA region, even if they do not actually end up doing business, 
can enjoy financial windfalls for loss of expected profits. Chapter 11 of 
NAFTA provided binding arbitration for investors against states over lost 
investments. These investor-state dispute provisions were the most 
controversial part of the agreement, for Chapter 11 “establishes a 
mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes that assures both 
equal treatment among investors of the Parties to the Agreement in 
accordance with the principle of international reciprocity and due process 
before an impartial tribunal.”181 A NAFTA investor—an individual or 
corporation that are non-state actors rather than one of the signatory 
countries—who alleges that a host government has breached its 
investment obligations, may choose one of three arbitral mechanisms: the 
World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), ICSID’s Additional Facility Rules, or the rules of the 
United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL 
Rules).182 Alternatively, the investor may choose the remedies available 
in the host country’s domestic courts.183 An important feature of the 
Chapter 11 arbitral provisions is the enforceability in domestic courts of 
final awards by arbitration tribunals.184 
This has been a boon for multinational corporations and their 
shareholders. These mechanisms are designed to protect investments—
                                                     
 179 Carlos Salas, Mexico’s Haves and Have-Nots: NAFTA Sharpens the Divide, NACLA REP. AMS., 
Jan./Feb. 2002, at 32, 33; Jaana Remes, A Tale of Two Mexicos: Growth and Propensity in a 
Two-Speed Economy, in NAFTA 20 YEARS LATER 30, 35 (2014), available at 
http://www.piie.com/publications/briefings/piieb14-3.pdf. 
 180 Michael Abramowitz, White House Defends NAFTA as Bush Meets With Heads of Mexico, 
Canada, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/04/21/AR2008042100256.html; see also Press Release, The White 
House, Press Conference by President Obama, President Peña Nieto, and Prime Minister Harper 
(Feb. 19, 2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/19/press-
conference-president-obama-president-pe-nieto-and-prime-minister-h; see also Patricia Rey 
Mallén, 20 Years of NAFTA: Enrique Peña Nieto, Barack Obama and Stephen Harper Talk the 
Economic Future of North America, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/20-years-nafta-enrique-pena-nieto-barack-obama-stephen-harper-talk-
economic-future-north-america. 
 181 NAFTA, Can.-Mex.-U.S., supra note 4, at ch. 11, art. 1115. 
 182 Id. at ch. 11, art. 1120. 
 183 Id. at ch. 11 art. 1135(2)(c). 
 184 Id. at ch. 11, art. 1136(4). 
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including the right for corporations to sue one or all of the NAFTA 
partner countries for expropriating, nationalizing, or otherwise “taking” 
an investment. This mechanism is very costly and thus only accessible to 
the largest of corporations. It has created a series of nuisance lawsuits to 
force foreign governments to capitulate for fear of incurring hundreds of 
millions of dollars of potential monetary damages and expensive legal 
fees.185 The long-standing doctrine of sovereign immunity has been 
turned on its head, as “foreign” investors sue sovereign states before 
independent and binding tribunals. 
D. THE SECURITY AND PROSPERITY PARTNERSHIP AND THE MÉRIDA 
INITIATIVE 
Building on NAFTA, the Security and Property Partnership 
(SPP), agreed to by Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin, Mexican 
President Vicente Fox, and US President George W. Bush in March 
2005, was a culmination of security initiatives and common defense 
policies but was not a treaty with legal obligations.186 According to a 
Canadian government website: 
                                                     
 185 See NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-TO-STATE CASES: BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY LESSONS 
FOR FAST TRACK AND THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS, PUB. CITIZEN 1, 1–4, (2001), 
available at https://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF186.PDF. In Ethyl v. Canada, Ethyl 
Corporation, a Virginia-based corporation developed a gasoline additive known as 
methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarboyl (MMT) and then exported it to Canada. After 
scientific studies brought light to the public health risks posed by MMT in 1997, the Canadian 
Parliament banned MMT. In response, Ethyl filed a NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-to-state claim 
against Canada and further argued that the ban was a violation of Article 1102 and 1106. After a 
NAFTA panel overruled Canada’s objection to the suit claiming that MMT was not a measure 
covered under Chapter 11, Canada settled the claim, resulting in Canada’s reversal of the MMT 
ban and paid $13 million to Ethyl for legal fees and damages. Todd Weiler, The Treatment Of 
SPS Measures Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Preliminary Answers to an Open-Ended Question, 26 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 229, 231–32 (2003). See also Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, in 
which the tribunal ordered Canada to pay investors $120,000. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, 
2000 UNCITRAL Trib., para. 18 (Can.) (final award on cost), available at 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes/canada/pope/pope-20.pdf; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, 
para. 33 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib. Jan 25, 2000) (final award on cost), available at 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes/canada/pope/pope-20.pdf. In S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. Canada, 
the Tribunal ordered Canada to pay $850,000 to S.D. Meyers, Inc. with respect to arbitration fees 
and legal representation. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 2002 UNCITRAL Trib., paras. 53–54 
(Can.) (final award, on costs), available at 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes/canada/sdmyers/myers-36.pdf. 
 186 See North American Leaders Show Unity, BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4376431.stm (last updated Mar. 23, 2005). 
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[t]he SPP. . . provides a flexible means for a dialogue, priority 
setting, collaboration and action on issues affecting the security, 
prosperity and quality of life of Canadians, Americans and Mexicans. 
It addresses diverse issues, such as border facilitation, the 
environment, food and product safety, and includes measures to 
improve overall North American competitiveness.187 
There was no actual agreement, nor any binding obligations to 
supplement NAFTA. By the time the three government leaders met at the 
second summit of the SPP in Cancun, Mexico in March 2006, they 
turned to corporate leaders and trade associations to work together to 
create a more integrated trade area.188 The North American 
Competitiveness Council, with thirty corporate representatives from 
some of North America’s largest corporations, reported to the Executive 
branches in the three NAFTA partner countries, and was directed to 
improve trade and commerce by liberalizing rules of origin, exchanging 
information on health and safety, and harmonizing use of symbols on 
textiles and apparel. The SPP was about doing business more efficiently, 
competing with other trade blocs, and taking advantage of comparative 
advantage.189 But without a multilateral treaty and a budget, and in the 
face of governmental inertia (in all three countries), not much came to 
pass in the end, and all talk of these initiatives came to a quiet end.190 
Also designed at a multilateral level, the Mérida Initiative191 is an 
attempt by the US and Mexican governments of allied countries to 
combat rising drug trafficking and other organized crime throughout 
Latin America.192 Launched in October 2007, this initiative responded to 
                                                     
 187 See About SPP, Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, GOV’T OF CANADA, 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/ae-ve/2011-2012/1405/ec-com1405-en-s2.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 
2015). 
 188 See generally Katherine Sciacchitano, From NAFTA to the SPP: Here Comes the Security and 
Prosperity Partnership, but–What Security? Whose Prosperity?, DOLLARS & SENSE, Jan.–Feb. 
2008, available at  http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2008/0108sciacchitano.html. 
 189 Neil Craik & Joseph DiMento, Environmental Cooperation in the (Partially) Disaggregated 
State: Lessons from the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
479, 484–92 (2008). 
 190 While the spp.gov website has been taken down, there are still archived materials available 
online, primarily those posted by the Canadian government. See About SPP, Security and 
Prosperity Partnership of North America, supra note 187. The US government has also made 
available some archived materials at http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/ae-ve/2011-2012/1405/ec-
com1405-en-s2.htm. See also http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rt/spp/. 
 191 See generally Merida Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/plrmo/157797.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
 192 A report from the Congressional Research Service provides an overview of the Mérida Initiative 
as of April 2014. See generally CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE & KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, CONG. 
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the Mexican government’s request for support from the United States. 
“As part of the Mérida Initiative’s emphasis on shared responsibility, the 
Mexican government pledged to deal with crime and corruption and the 
US government pledged to address drug demand and the illicit 
trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico.”193 Between 2008 
and 2014, the US Congress appropriated over $2.4 billion for Mérida 
Initiative programs in Mexico.194 For fiscal year 2015, another $201 
million was allocated for Mexico through these programs.195 The Mérida 
Initiative provides funds for border-security equipment, law enforcement 
training and resources, investment in economic sectors, and improving 
the coordination for international intelligence sharing.196 
Corporations, including Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. and General 
Automatics, have done well under the Mérida Initiative.197 In 2014, the 
United States approved a plan to sell eighteen Black Hawk helicopters 
made by Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. to Mexico for $680 million.198 “With 
engines made by a unit of General Electric Co., the Pentagon’s Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency said spare parts, training, and other 
expenses take the potential contract value to $680.”199 Some US defense 
                                                     
RESEARCH SERV., R41349, U.S.–MEXICAN SECURITY COOPERATION: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE 
AND BEYOND (2015). 
 193 SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 192, at 6. 
 194 Mexico, too, made a significant investment in public security. In 2006 alone, Mexico’s federal 
government invested an estimated $3.5 billion dollars in security and public safety. M. en E. 
Reyes Tépach M., El Presupuesto Público Federal para la FUNCIÓN SEGURIDAD PÚBLICA, 
2013-14, [The Federal Government Budget for Public Safety, 2013-14], DIRECCIÓN GENERAL 
DE SERVICIOS DE DOCUMENTACIÓN, INVESTIGACIÓN Y ANÁLSIS, at 44 (enero 2014), available 
at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/sia/se/SAE-ISS-02-14.pdf (Mex.); SEELKE & FINKLEA, 
supra note 192, at 27. 
 195  SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 192, at 27. In October 2014, the U.S. State Department held 
back some of this assistance because of human rights obligations that the Mexican military was 
not meeting. Elisabeth Malkin & Azam Ahmed, U.S. Withholds $5 Million in Antidrug Aid to 
Mexico as Human Rights Rebuke, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2015, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/20/world/americas/us-withholds-5-million-in-antidrug-aid-to-
mexico-over-human-rights.html?_r=0 (last visited on Oct. 23, 2015). 
 196 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-837, MÉRIDA INITIATIVE: THE 
UNITED STATES HAS PROVIDED COUNTERNARCOTICS AND ANTICRIME SUPPORT BUT NEEDS 
BETTER PERFORMANCE MEASURES (2010), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10837.pdf. 
 197 Christy Thornton, Obama’s Support for Mexico Prioritizes Investors Over Citizens, AL JAZEERA 
AMERICA (Jan. 13, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/1/mexico-obama-
economy.html. 
 198 Doug Cameron, U.S. Plans to Sell Mexico 18 Black Hawks to Tackle Drug Trade, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 21, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304734304579516033688851754.   
 199 Id. 
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companies are exporting unsold military technologies to compensate for 
falling domestic sales.200 A plethora of private corporations now play a 
role in the detection, apprehension, incarceration, and removal of 
undocumented migrants. They include the Correction Corporation of 
America, Wackenhutt, Geo4S, British Aerospace, Boeing, Raytheon, and 
a host of others.201 
III. WHY IS THE RISE OF PRIVATE ACTORS BAD? 
The rise of private actors at the border is problematic for a 
number of reasons. First, this is a further example of the hollowing out of 
the state.202 During the Administration of Ronald Reagan and the years of 
leadership of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain, there was a focus on 
reducing government regulation and state intervention—so-called 
“neoliberalism:”203 
[n]eo-liberalism is primarily concerned to promote a market-guided 
transition towards the new economic regime (e.g. Reaganism in the 
USA and Thatcherism in the UK). For the public sector, it involves a 
mixture of privatization, liberalization and adoption of commercial 
criteria in the residual state sector; for the private sector, it involves 
deregulation and a new legal and political framework providing 
passive support for market solution.204 
The hollowing out of the state is another way to see the changes in state 
sovereignty—the move from government to governance. For Professor 
Bob Jessop, the 1980s were the time for the debate over the future of the 
nation-state and its ability to solve the world’s bigger problems or 
society’s smaller problems.205 Global capitalism is a phenomenon that the 
                                                     
 200 Id. 
 201 See generally Tom Dart, Inside the US “Border Industrial Complex”: Spy Tech Meets 
Immigration Crackdown, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 26, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/26/surveillance-border-security-expo. 
 202 Bob Jessop, Hollowing Out the “Nation-State” and Multilevel Governance, in A HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE SOCIAL POLICY 11, 15–16 (Patricia Kennett ed., 2013); see Timothy Noah, How 
Privatizing Government Hollowed Out the Middle Class, MSNBC (June 3, 2014), 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/government-privatization-hurts-middle-class. 
 203 See generally R.A.W. Rhodes, The Hollowing Out of the State: The Changing Nature of the 
Public Service in Britain, 65 POL. Q. 138 (1994); see also Chris Skelcher, Changing Images of 
the State: Overloaded, Hollowed-Out, Congested, PUB. POL’Y & ADMIN., Autumn 2000, at 3, 3–
19. 
 204 Bob Jessop, Post-Fordism and the State, in POST-FORDISM: A READER 251, 266 (Ash Amin ed., 
1994) . 
 205 Hollowing Out the ‘Nation-State’ and Multilevel Governance, supra note, at 202. 
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nation-state could not adequately address. The state is re-scaling its 
powers, both upwards and downwards, shifting away from traditional 
roles and taking on more of a network-based governance. 
Protecting the border seems like an inherently governmental 
function,206 one to be undertaken solely by state authorities, rather than 
outsourced by commission (like Boeing was for SBInet) or omission 
(like the border vigilantes). Contracting shifts public accountability to the 
private sphere.207 The incentives to privatize are compelling, yet one 
unavoidable fact is that privatization creates a large probability of 
placing detainees in harm’s way. More specifically, members of our 
national community208 will be subject to unmonitored offenses within our 
borders. These offenses are prevalent in private detention facilities, as 
immigration detainees are subject to overcrowded prisons,209 treated with 
indifference when it comes to their medical care,210 including mental 
health.211 They are subject to unnecessary shackling,212 are fed 
inadequately,213 and often with expired food.214 Also, detainees are 
                                                     
 206 An inherently governmental function was defined as a “function that is so intimately related to 
the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees.” Federal 
Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–270, § 5, 112 Stat. 2382, 2384 (1998). 
 207 See DEBORAH D. AVANT, THE MARKET FOR FORCE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATIZING 
SECURITY 57–65 (2005) (citing that private contractors are accountable to its stockholders, other 
market incentives, and some federal legislation, whereas, the government is accountable to 
Congressional budgets, federal laws, and potential governmental disciplinary measures); 
Blackwater and the Privatization of Immigration Control, supra note 87, at 474–76 (claiming 
that the transfer of legal liability is an incentive for government outsourcing and as a 
consequence such outsourcing can go “beyond the review authority of the courts of Congress”). 
 208 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (stating aliens have lawfully been recognized as 
persons).  
 209 See, e.g., [Proposed] Second Amended Complaint for Classwide Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief at 10, Kiniti et al. v. Myers, No. 3:05-cv-01013-DMS-PCL (S.D. Cal. 2007) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Amended Complaint, Kiniti et al. v. Myers]. 
 210 Id. at 2. 
 211 Brook House Immigration Detention Center - Fundamentally Unsafe, July 12, 2010, U.K. 
IMMIGR. MAG., http://immigrantmagazine.co.uk/?p=1836 [hereinafter Brook House]. 
 212 Letter from Sear Riordan, Staff Attorney, the Am. Civil Liberties Union Found., San Diego & 
Imperial Cnty, to Daniel P. Struck, Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., & Robin F. Baker, Field 
Office Dir., Det. & Removal Operations, ICE (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with author), available at 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/publications/aclu-letter-to-ice-re-abusive-shackling-of-
immigration-detainees-at-the-san-diego-correctional-facility-2009/ (conveying that there is 
abusive shackling of immigration detainees at the San Diego Correctional Facility, a department 
controlled by the CCA). 
 213 See id.; see also Amended Complaint, supra note 209, at 14 (illustrating that when detainees are 
on lockdown, they are left without meals and are forced to stay in their cells all day). 
 214 Private Prisons Turns on Employees for Speaking Out, YOUTUBE (Mar. 9, 2012), 
http://youtu.be/a4AFHBSTeQE. 
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victims of additional tort violations such as assault,215 battery,216 rape,217 
and even death.218 Such injuries are also known to occur during the 
removal process abroad when a detainee is still in a private security 
company’s custody.219 
This industry has led to “a lightning rod for credible human-
rights abuse litigation.”220 Unfortunately, these offenses, coupled with the 
privatization process, an arguably irreversible occurrence,221 has led to “a 
corporate veil [that] distorts lines of legal responsibility.”222 Is it little 
wonder that corporations are not trusted? “[T]he general public’s view of 
corporations is not favorable. Interestingly, people in developed 
markets—including the U.S., U.K., Germany, Japan, and Hong Kong—
retain especially skeptical views.”223 Professors Ugo Mattei and Laura 
Nader lament: 
[t]he mechanisms through which the transnational rule of law, as a 
deeply Western idea, has led incrementally to patterns of global 
plunder, a process initiated by the expansion of Euro-American 
society worldwide, and now continued by nations, in particularly the 
USA, and multinational corporate entities independent of explicit 
political or military colonialism.224 
                                                     
 215 Mike Riggs, Prison Guard Instructs Immigrant Detainee to Drink His Semen, Gets Slap on the 
Wrist, REASON.COM (Dec. 19, 2011), http://reason.com/blog/2011/12/19/corrections-corp-of-
america-guard-forces. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Hamish Campbell, Voices from Yarl’s Wood–Update 1, DAILYMOTION (Feb. 27, 2010), 
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xce2h5_voices-from-yarl-s-wood-update-1_news. 
 218 Erin Rosa, GEO Group, Inc.: Despite a Crashing Economy, Private Prison Firm Turns a 
Handsome Profit, CORPWATCH (Mar. 1, 2009), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15308. 
 219 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Can Privatization Kill?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/opinion/when-it-comes-to-immigration-privatization-can-
kill.html (explaining an incident on a plane where a PSC agent’s indifference to a detained 
person’s medical needs, led to a death. This led the New York Times to declare that privatization 
“eliminates government accountability and runs roughshod over the rights of those subjected to 
private corporations’ control”). 
 220 Robert Koulish, A Corporate Takeover of American Borders, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 21, 2006, 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2006-08-21/news/0608210032_1_private-companies-border-
military-contractors. 
 221 LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PRESERVING PUBLIC VALUES IN A 
WORLD OF PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS 16–17 (2011). 
 222 Gammeltoft-Hansen, supra note 219. 
 223 Donald Baer, The West’s Bruised Confidence in Capitalism, WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2015), 
available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-baer-the-wests-bruised-confidence-in-
capitalism-1411358403. 
 224 UGO MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL 2 (2008). 
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The general decline of civil rights protection manifests south of the 
border. With the breakdown of public security in Mexico due to the drug 
war and its attendant phenomenon (as described above), there is 
effectively little rule of law south of the border. It is no surprise then that 
the war between cartels and the Mexican government (with money from 
the US Government through the Mérida Initiative) has been so brutal. 
With the choice of plata o plumo (money or a bullet), Mexico has 
suffered an unprecedented number of murders related to the drugs war225 
and a massive drop in confidence in the administration of justice. 
At the north of the border, the US government has been absent 
with a unified and uniform response:226 
Devolution became federal policy in the 1996 Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which included 
a clause known as section 287(g) that invited state, county, and city 
law enforcement agencies to sign partnerships with the federal 
government to enforce civil violations of federal immigration law.227 
US immigration law is different in different judicial districts and 
immigration courts.228 This creates more insecurity among migrants 
seeking to obtain redress for their immigration status in the United 
States.229 That the low-skilled value of these workers is disposable adds 
to this insecurity. 
                                                     
 225 According to Human Rights Watch’s World 2012 Report, “Mexico has experienced a dramatic 
surge in homicides in recent years, driven in large part by the violent struggle between and 
within powerful criminal organizations to control the drug trade and other lucrative illicit 
businesses such as human trafficking.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012: MEXICO 
1 (2012). 
 226 “Enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws was once firmly under federal control, with local 
law enforcement playing an occasional supportive role upon request. That has changed. The 
federal government began to devolve enforcement power to the local level in 1996, offering to 
train officers in police departments and other local law enforcement agencies to arrest and screen 
suspected unauthorized immigrants.” MONICA VARSANYI, PAUL LEWIS, DORIS PROVINE, & 
SCOTT DECKER, IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM: WHICH POLICY PREVAILS?, MIGRATION POL’Y 
INST., Oct. 9, 2012, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigration-federalism-
which-policy-prevails. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. 
 229 “States and localities can have significant interest in the manner and extent to which federal 
officials enforce provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) regarding the exclusion 
and removal of unauthorized aliens. Some States and localities, concerned that federal 
enforcement disrupts families and communities, or infringes upon human rights, have adopted 
“sanctuary” policies limiting their cooperation in federal efforts. Other states and localities, in 
contrast, concerned about the costs of providing benefits or services to unauthorized aliens, or 
such aliens settling in their communities, have adopted measures to deter unauthorized aliens 
from entering or remaining within their jurisdiction. In some cases, such states or localities have 
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There has been a commodification of labor in the North 
American marketplace. Under NAFTA, labor issues, like environmental 
issues, were relegated to side agreements, out of range of the dispute 
resolution mechanisms for which the main guts of NAFTA provides.230 
This has provided for a devaluation of labor because it is an abundant, 
cheap, and unprotected commodity.231 The extremely low wages and long 
hours at maquiladoras foster “the sense that workers are cheap, 
disposable commodities.”232 Labor falls into the markets as if it were 
mainly a commodity, “subordinating the social to the ‘laws of the 
market.’”233 Labor is increasingly being commoditized in global markets, 
where international corporations are free to roam the world and hire the 
most vulnerable workers.234 
Migrant workers, who by definition have fewer freedoms, can be 
more vulnerable than average wage workers.235 Low-skilled migrant 
workers are seen “as an expendable resource, a resource whose social 
protection and continued reproduction is of little or no concern.”236 
Migrant workers have become more vulnerable after NAFTA, which has 
increased the free flow of trade between the participatory countries.237 
Neither labor rights nor environmental protections are in the main 
agreement of NAFTA. The Chapter 20 dispute resolution mechanisms do 
not cover these issues at all.238 
In turn, we have seen the opposite side of the same globalization 
coin—a rise in unchecked profits and a growing lack of regulation over 
the activities of multinational corporations. The privatization scheme is 
what Professors Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader have lamented: 
                                                     
also sued to compel federal officials to enforce the immigration laws, or to compensate them for 
costs associated with unauthorized migration.” KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
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 230 Ruben J. Garcia, Labor as Property: Guestworkers, International Trade and the Democracy 
Deficit, 10 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 27 (2006). 
 231 See generally id. 
 232 Debbie Nathan, Work, Sex and Danger in Ciudad Juarez, NACLA REP. AMS., Nov.–Dec. 1999, 
at 25. 
 233 Stuart Rosewarne, Globalization and the Commodities of Labour: Temporary Labour Migrants, 
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 238 Garcia, supra note 230, at 49. 
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[t]he law, as constructed today by means of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreement, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and World Bank contexts of conditionality, and the ethno-
centric nature of many rights discourses, is a rule of law that justifies 
looting to the paradoxical point of being itself illegal. At issue is 
whether the rule of law, operating in the context of colonialism and 
imperialism, results in disorder rather than order, providing for 
continuity in oppression rather than interruption of the colonial 
practice.239 
Some critics have called the investor-state dispute resolution provisions 
of Chapter 11 of NAFTA, “corporate welfare,” profiteering centers, or 
worse, an abdication of national sovereignty, and the end of sovereign 
immunity.240 Moreover, the economic benefits of NAFTA are still open 
to argument.241 
NAFTA lowered trade tariffs between the three participatory 
countries, which gave foreign actors confidence to invest in Mexico.242 
While the county has experienced economic growth, several sectors 
within the country have experienced the opposite effect. Since 1994, 
economic activity has steadily increased in Mexico, which has benefited 
the rich and harmed the poor:243 “[T]here are agreements like the North 
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President Obama defends the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a far-reaching agreement to tear down 
trade barriers between the United States and 11 other nations, he often argues it would cure the 
ills inflicted on American workers by trade pacts of the past, particularly the North American 
Free Trade Agreement. But on Friday, when his Council of Economic Advisers issued a report 
promoting the economic benefits of trade, one of its main claims was that taken together, trade 
agreements the United States has signed onto in the past had not, in fact, led to the outsourcing of 
any American jobs.”). See COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF U.S. 
TRADE (2015), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_trade_report_final_non-
embargoed_v2.pdf. 
 242 Roberto Rosas, Trademarks Under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), With 
References to the Current Mexican Law, 18 MARQ. INTELL PROP. L. REV. 167, 173 (2014). 
 243 Faux, supra note 237; CHRISTOPHER WILSON, WORKING TOGETHER: ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN 
THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, WILSON CENTER (2011), available at 
http://wilsoncenter.org/publication/working-together-economic-ties-between-the-united-states-
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the chain of events 
leading to poverty are increasingly visible.”244 NAFTA increased foreign 
investment, displaced Mexican workers, devastated local communities 
with maquiladora factories, decreased wages for the working class, and 
increased wages for the upper class. NAFTA has led to huge social 
dislocation across Mexico: 
[t]he North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) allowed U.S. 
produce to complete with local produce. Instead of sending produce 
to the outside, what we found were mountain villages swamped with 
produce from the outside—foodstuff such as corn, beans, eggs, and 
junk food, as well as machines, computers, and commercial music. 
We also found agricultural lands in disuse. Young people had 
emigrated from what were only 40 years earlier self-contained, self-
sufficient communities, and were now sending remittances homes, 
which people could use to buy global goods imported into the 
region.245 
NAFTA’s successor arrangement, the Security and Prosperity 
Partnership, also gave some pause. Critics painted the SPP as the 
blueprint for a takeover by the corporations.246 Elected representatives in 
the United States saw the lack of democratic oversight as troublesome: 
“Some key issues for Congress regarding the SPP concern possible 
implications related to private sector priorities, national sovereignty, 
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open-borders policy and its decision to ignore the enforcement of this country’s immigration 
laws is part of a broader agenda. President Bush signed a formal agreement that will end the 
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COOPER_FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2016  3:53 PM 
140 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
transportation corridors, cargo security, and border security.”247 (Italics 
added). 
In addition, this Article has explored the reduction of law and 
order at the US-Mexico border, given the amount of activities by private 
actors. The civil liberties of migrants are, at times, at risk with the border 
vigilantes. With noms de guerre like “Kingfisher,” “Bear Scout,” and 
“The Pirate,” the border vigilantes attracted much media attention in 
their quest to do the work that the US government could not or was not 
willing to do. But to patrol the border with Mexico meant taking on the 
law. The American Civil Liberties Union, National Lawyers Guild and 
various Hispanic advocacy groups worried over the treatment of 
Mexican nationals and others if border vigilantes caught undocumented 
migrants making their way into the United States.248 
In April 2005, Chris Simcox from the Minutemen Project sent 
volunteer civilians with weapons to patrol “thirty-seven kilometers of 
desert between Douglas and Naco, Arizona, to the West.”249 During the 
time that the Minutemen were patrolling the border, Douglas businesses 
suffered because people from the Mexican side were not crossing to buy 
groceries in response to the presence of the Minutemen.250 
Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission had planned to 
publish maps to assist migrants in their trek across the desert in 
collaboration with Human Borders, a US-based non-governmental 
organization. The groups had to scrap their plans as the Minutemen 
announced that the maps would provide them with actionable 
intelligence to intercept more migrants and thwart their attempts to cross 
into the United States illegally. The maps would have provided details to 
migrants about the terrain, mobile telephone coverage, and the location 
of water stations set up by Humane Borders.251 
The anti-Latino sentiment that runs with the nativist expression 
of self-defense (protecting the homeland) has fostered a reaction in the 
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organized criminal organizations among Latinos. In response to the 
volunteer surveillance activities by US Minutemen groups, the Central 
American gang Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) stated that they would be 
targeting the US nativist groups to “teach them a lesson.”252 With all this, 
the US-Mexico border seems less secure, more dangerous, and less 
controlled by the authorities entrusted and empowered by the two 
respective governments on both sides of it. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Borders are by their very nature contested sites. The US-Mexico 
border is emblematic of this. Portrayed in music (Manu Chau’s Welcome 
to Tijuana), film (Stephen Soderberg’s Traffic), and literature (Carlos 
Fuentes’ The Crystal Frontier), the US-Mexico border is viewed as a 
place of promise and potential but also one of tragedy—the place where 
dreams go to live and die—all at the same time. What has been going on 
at the border over the last two or so decades is a bipolar response: On the 
one hand there is free trade, integrated supply chains, interchange of 
technology and labor, source of corporate profits for global capital.253 On 
the other hand there is an emerging state of emergency due to a 
breakdown of rule of law. 
The state of emergency includes the inadequate response from 
the US government concerning the summer 2014 surge of 68,000 
unaccompanied minors from Central America at the US-Mexico border 
seeking asylum.254 The state of emergency includes the rise of self-
defense groups proliferating in Mexican towns as a reaction to the lack of 
public security in the country. The state of emergency also includes the 
lack of adequate legislative action from the US government to tackle the 
“broken” immigration system, stymieing itself in the theater of 
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temporary protective status from deportation and other subpar executive 
actions by the US president. Finally, the state of emergency includes the 
reality that cartels effectively control territory and supplant legitimate 
authority, thus abrogating the social contract between the governed and 
the government. The transnational nature of the private actors operating 
in the US-Mexico border region does pose significant challenges for the 
two sovereign states that are tasked with protecting and defending those 
borders. 
The US government has increased number of federal officers and 
the tools they can use to help secure the border. Drones, tunnel detection, 
and other technologies are being deployed to look for contraband on the 
move to the United States. Mexico, too, has responded with force. Upon 
assuming power as President of Mexico in December 2006, Felipe 
Calderón ordered 50,000 federal troops to deploy throughout the country. 
They continue to occupy much of Mexico. His successor, Enrique Pena-
Nieto, who assumed the Presidency in December 2012, believed that if 
he did not talk about the war on drugs and focused only on now 
seemingly elusive economic growth,255 then the war on drugs would be 
over.256 Sadly, the drugs war rages on257 and the US-Mexico border is a 
frontline of that war. 
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